Van Gulick Optimistic's Point Of View Analysis
3.7.2 Knowing what it is like, Van Gulick optimistic’s point of view
Multiple realization implies that any given creature with a brain suitable to interact with the world has a very rich mental life, and should have conscious experience. According to Nagel “… fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something chat it is like to be that organism something it is like for the organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience” (Nagel, 1974/2002, p. 219). However this experience, according to Nagel, is hard to defend from a physical point of view. Nagel argues that "every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable than an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view” (Nagel, 1974/2002, p. 220), for that reason consciousness according to Nagel may escape our understanding, at least for now; in this sense Nagel suggests that “any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective-objective” (Nagel, 1974/2002, p. 225). In other words, Nagel does not rule out a possible physicalist account of consciousness, but this, according to Nagel, awaits advances in science. However, I would argue that a better metaphysics of consciousness is also required, and that non-reductive physicalism is the best option, as Van Gulick points out, “[i]t is pluralistic about theories, languages, and ways of understanding, but monist …show more content…
Other philosophers, such as McGinn (1989), suggest that explanation of neural correlates and consciousness will escape our understanding. Nonetheless, the gap needs to be reduced and any advance at the empirical level is important. This is the basic point of Robert Van Gulick, who argues
Multiple realization implies that any given creature with a brain suitable to interact with the world has a very rich mental life, and should have conscious experience. According to Nagel “… fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something chat it is like to be that organism something it is like for the organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience” (Nagel, 1974/2002, p. 219). However this experience, according to Nagel, is hard to defend from a physical point of view. Nagel argues that "every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable than an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view” (Nagel, 1974/2002, p. 220), for that reason consciousness according to Nagel may escape our understanding, at least for now; in this sense Nagel suggests that “any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective-objective” (Nagel, 1974/2002, p. 225). In other words, Nagel does not rule out a possible physicalist account of consciousness, but this, according to Nagel, awaits advances in science. However, I would argue that a better metaphysics of consciousness is also required, and that non-reductive physicalism is the best option, as Van Gulick points out, “[i]t is pluralistic about theories, languages, and ways of understanding, but monist …show more content…
Other philosophers, such as McGinn (1989), suggest that explanation of neural correlates and consciousness will escape our understanding. Nonetheless, the gap needs to be reduced and any advance at the empirical level is important. This is the basic point of Robert Van Gulick, who argues