Unleashing the Power of Marketing
Unleashing The Power Of Marketing
When GE realized that its products would no longer sell themselves, it had to invent a formidable marketing function from scratch. by Beth Comstock, Ranjay Gulati, and Stephen Liguori
90 Harvard Business Review October 2010
HBR.ORG
J
ILLUSTRATION: GARY NEILL
ust 10 years ago General Electric had no substantial marketing organization. For decades the company had been so confident in its technologies that it seemed to believe the products could market themselves. People designated as marketers were assigned to sales support (lead generation and trade shows, for example) or communications (advertising and promotional materials). In discussions about corporate strategy, marketing wasn’t at the table. At best it was considered a support function; at worst, overhead. In a few GE businesses, such as appliances and the former plastics unit, marketing was a viable contributor; but in most of the others, its brilliant minds were languishing in dead-end jobs. Many internal skeptics did not see how marketing as a function could help GE grow its businesses. Take GE Aviation, the multibillion-dollar division that develops and manufactures jet engines for commercial and military aircraft. The commercial aviation industry is relatively simple: a handful of aircraft manufacturers, two GE competitors (Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney), and about 300 airlines. “You could put the entire industry in a conference room— it’s that compact,” says Thomas Gentile, the vice president of engine services for GE Aviation and a former chief marketing officer at GE Capital. “So the challenge was how could market research really help us? Because we could literally pick up the phone and call everyone in the industry who mattered and find out what was on their mind.” But things were changing. The businesses were maturing, and like other companies, GE was learning that it could not win simply by launching increasingly sophisticated technologies or by
When GE realized that its products would no longer sell themselves, it had to invent a formidable marketing function from scratch. by Beth Comstock, Ranjay Gulati, and Stephen Liguori
90 Harvard Business Review October 2010
HBR.ORG
J
ILLUSTRATION: GARY NEILL
ust 10 years ago General Electric had no substantial marketing organization. For decades the company had been so confident in its technologies that it seemed to believe the products could market themselves. People designated as marketers were assigned to sales support (lead generation and trade shows, for example) or communications (advertising and promotional materials). In discussions about corporate strategy, marketing wasn’t at the table. At best it was considered a support function; at worst, overhead. In a few GE businesses, such as appliances and the former plastics unit, marketing was a viable contributor; but in most of the others, its brilliant minds were languishing in dead-end jobs. Many internal skeptics did not see how marketing as a function could help GE grow its businesses. Take GE Aviation, the multibillion-dollar division that develops and manufactures jet engines for commercial and military aircraft. The commercial aviation industry is relatively simple: a handful of aircraft manufacturers, two GE competitors (Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney), and about 300 airlines. “You could put the entire industry in a conference room— it’s that compact,” says Thomas Gentile, the vice president of engine services for GE Aviation and a former chief marketing officer at GE Capital. “So the challenge was how could market research really help us? Because we could literally pick up the phone and call everyone in the industry who mattered and find out what was on their mind.” But things were changing. The businesses were maturing, and like other companies, GE was learning that it could not win simply by launching increasingly sophisticated technologies or by