Thomson's Summary Of The People Seed

Thomson, however, recognizes the fault in her analogy – burglars have a choice to enter the house while children do not. She then utilizers her thought experiment to account for the discrepancy. She asks her audience to consider that people-seeds were simply drifting around in the air and, if the circumstances are right, one may float into a window and take root in the carpet, despite if all precautionary measures were taken. She argues that the “people-seed” does not have a right to house, despite coming in through an open window. She uses this analogy to demonstrate a women who had consensual intercourse, but took preventative measures which failed (390). However, Thomson overlooks the property of responsibility. In the analogy of the people-seeds,
She does not believe there is a fundamental connection between being moral and being decent; one can act indecent yet still act morally. In the case of the violinist, if circumstances were changed so that being plugged into him would not affect the women’s health and it were only for an hour, “it would be indecent to refuse” yet not be morally wrong if she did (390). After wavering into the camp of deontological ethics, she immediately returns to utilitarian and creates inconsistencies within her argument. Nevertheless, she goes on to dissolve the argument of her opponent that rights, as insofar they are just or unjust, depend on convenience. In the case of the violinist, if the person has only to remain plugged in for one hour, it would seem to be that the person has a responsibility to remain plugged in. However, the duration the violinist needs to remain plugged in cannot determine the actions of the person kidnapped. While this is the entirety of her clarification, she realizes her opponents will disagree as long as a human life is being used in the analogy. Therefore, she presents a more palatable analogy: the boys and chocolate. If two boys were given one box of chocolate to share, it would be unjust for the older to take it all for himself. It is unjust only as the boys were given equal part of the chocolate. However, if only the older boy were to be given the box of
She proceeds to give a recount of Luke 10:25, the story of the Good Samaritan. Her point in doing so is rather ineffective and could have gone without the biblical analogy – used perhaps to convict those of a particular religion. Her point is the rules of morality seem to diverge when it comes to gender: “in no state in this country is any man compelled by law to be even a Minimally Recent [sic] Samaritan to any person” while “women are compelled by law to be not merely Minimally Decent Samaritans, but Good Samaritans to unborn persons inside them” (393). However, in doing so she admits not having an abortion is a good thing. The logic should follow that having an abortion is a bad thing, but she does not admit this. She simply admits that not having an abortion is an inherently good action, not made good in relation to having an abortion. Her argument of the minimally decent Samaritan resonates with her supporters under the circumstances that if a man can walk away from a pregnancy, a women should be able to. This, however, becomes legalistic and takes emphasis away from morality, rights, and unjust actions. Her minimally decent Samaritan argument is rather arbitrary as there are no other actions she provides for that which makes one a minimally decent Samaritan yet she sees it as “a standard we must not fall below” (394).