Therapeutic Externalism Analysis

The Perceived Constraint of Semantic Externalism
One of the more well-known arguments against Putnam’s usage of semantic externalism is his oversight of context. Imagine a situation where a person has only recently transformed into a BIV. In this instance, the BIV would be able to refer to things from the external world, as it possesses a causal link to said things. In this way, the statement “I am a BIV” can refrain from committing self-refutation while accounting for semantic externalism. This objection however, has certain limitations. Namely, its justifications fail in the case where the BIVs have always been BIVs.
Another possible solution to Putnam’s argument is to reject semantic externalism altogether. This debate however, extends into the broader realm of
He concludes that “once we see that the qualitative similarity […] between the thoughts of the BIVs and the thoughts of someone in the actual world by no means implies sameness of reference, it is not hard to see that there is no basis at all for regarding the brain in a vat referring to external things.” Madden’s argument for self-ascription shows however, that it is necessary to allow the proposition that BIVs can refer to external objects, if one wants to maintain that BIVs are capable of self-reference. Moreover, semantic externalism fails in the context where BIVs have somehow accessed the external world. Lastly, I am of the opinion that Putnam’s argument performs the fundamental error of begging the question. That is, presuming the participant of the experiment to already reside in the external world when the purpose of the experiment is to test this in the first place. It is with these objections in mind (as I cannot perceive how Putnam can respond to these objections) do I declare Putnam’s argument against BIVs as