Theories Of Strategic Bombing

The first part of the twentieth century proved to be one of the most volatile times in American and European history. The First World War had ravaged the European continent; destroyed economies, and displaced millions of people. As the war came to an end the emergence of strategic bombing theory and its application began to take shape. Principal among its architects were primarily military officers who had served during World War One in aviation units. The theory of strategic bombing was formed out of necessity to regain the offensive advantage during war. World War One became a global stalemate, the weapons of the era largely enforced military operations of a defensive posture rather than an offensive posture. As the theory of strategic bombing
Giulio Douhet was an Italian aviation Commander in World War One. He published his first book on strategic bombing in 1921, Command of the Air. Douhet argues that artillery and submarines changed how war would be fought on land and sea. He also argued that new military technology gave the advantage to the defense. His conclusion was that neither side could deal a “death blow” or an attack “which leaves a deep gaping wound and the feeling of imminent death.” His air strategy centered on new technology developed as a result of the Great War. Douhet theorized that with the advancement in air technology and chemicals during the Great War, it would make high-explosive bombing raids over any enemy sector possible. Making it possible to ravage the enemy’s country with chemical and bacteriological munitions. Effectively delivering a “death blow” from the air. He believed that this style of warfare was far superior and gave the battlefield a third dimension. Douhet saw aerial bombing as the future and the technological advancement coupled with the military tactics it would employ exhilarated him. His air strategy was grounded on destroying the enemy air force then bombing large targets only and often. “The objective must be destroyed completely in one attack, making further attacks on the same target unnecessary.” Douhet not only theorized the types of
As the war waged on it became a small portion of a much larger picture centered on a ground invasion of the European continent. Strategic bombing was able to cripple much of Germany’s industry rendering much of its new production useless. This kept Germany from keeping pace with technical advancement and producing newer versions of its airplanes and submarines. The effect that that strategic bombing had on Germany by 1945 was concluded in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War) which read “The German experience suggests that even a first class military power—rugged and resilient as Germany was—cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory.” By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Armament production was falling permanently, orderliness within the war effort disappeared, and total disruption and disintegration had ramped up. “Germany’s army was still in the field but with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting—any effective fighting—within a few months. Germany was mortally wounded.” Germany was destroyed and much of it was in large part due to strategic bombing. From an idea thought up by a man taking photos of a