The Schuman Declaration: Analysis

The Schuman Declaration was published on the ninth of May, 1950, and was one of these documents the contemporary European Union (EU) cannot praise enough as it bears the laudable responsibility for the birth of federal Europe. One could compare it with the Old Testament for the Christians, to put it colloquial, where further research reveals that both documents contain dubious and tentative elements.
Evidently, the focus here remains solely on the Schuman Plan, which is to be found in the annex at the end of this paper and was retrieved from the official site of the Robert Schuman Foundation (2017). At a first glance, all official institutions ought to publish important official documents unspoilt, however, this should not be taken for granted.
The overall text is veiled with a political stance, advocating cooperation in the form of incremental steps towards a federation, solidarity and the solvation of the Franco-German animosity. The economic unification is the means, and stability for the continent is the end. Nonetheless, some specific peculiarities or false beliefs shed the EU in a different light than would be expected. At least three recurring analytical questions reoccur (Scott, 1952; Stoffers, 2017) these involve: who is the intended audience? Why was it published on that exact date? And what are the motivations of the author? These three questions (why – how – when) will guide as the structure for the following measurement of
Primarily, it is directly appointed to Germany with the proposal of a unification, but presents the plan as an open call for all European states to unite. As stated in Milward (2000), the notion of a united Europe was already spreading in wartime governments. This is understandable as it can be argued that the Second World War was a peak in nationalism, which has proven to be fatal for the peace and freedom of the population. So, the public opinion was not an easy one to convince, regarding this background, as it would imply that the participating Member States would be obliged to attribute some of their sovereignty to this High Authority of the embryotic European Union. Thus, it is important to distinguish between to whom Schuman’s speech was intended. On the one side, it now made public the ambition to unite coal and steel industry for France and Germany, but also other interested nations. On the other hand, diplomacy reveals that some form of discussion on this topic already took place on a higher political level. This is, inter alia, demonstrated by Churchill’s acknowledgement that a united continent rests upon the Franco-German balance (1946) and the notification of the Schuman plan a day before publication, to mr. Acheson, the US Secretary of State (Judt, 2005, pp. 155-156) and by the collection of Monnet’s