The Role Of Virtue In David Hume's Treatise Of Human Nature

In his Treatise of Human Nature David Hume offers two categories of virtue which aim to divide the moral terrain into the natural and the artificial virtues. In order to assess Hume’s distinction, I shall firstly establish what Hume identifies ‘virtue’ to be. I shall then proceed to catalogue two distinctions employed by Hume in establishing his distinction: their degree of partiality and equality and the motive distinction. As Hume’s distinction has been contested for its blurriness I shall thus proceed to refocus Hume’s distinction by arguing that it is their motive that ultimately keeps them distinct, thus justifying Hume’s distinction

Hume’s philosophical thinking breaks down morality into a three-part division. He distinguishes between
This recognition is consequently strengthened by custom and habit and a ‘cultivated affection for the pleasures of society’ The restraint of avidity by the understanding makes possible conventions securing the ‘stability of material goods’. These conventions concerning the stability of material goods establish the conventions of justice. Hence what distinguishes these artificial virtues is that the motive is only capable of giving rise to moral approbation in a context constructed by established artifice and conventions. Whilst it is possible to consider situations where the motives of a charitable person, such as benevolence (a natural virtue), may be neither agreeable nor useful to the agent or others in a particular context, Hume would maintain that charity is not, under such conditions, virtuous. This is because Hume’s morally division of virtue and vice is established on the grounds that virtues are agreeable or useful to the agent or to others because it is what permits him to explain our moral distinction which appeals to our moral sentiments of approbation and