The Role of Institutional
Investors in Promoting Good
The Role of Institutional
Investors in Promoting
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Please cite this publication as:
OECD (2011), The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing.
ISBN 978-92-64-12874-3 (print)
ISBN 978-92-64-12875-0 (PDF)
Series: Corporate Governance:
ISSN 2077-6527 (print)
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his report presents the results of the second thematic peer review based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The report is focused on the role of institutional investors in promoting good corporate governance practices including the incentives they face to promote such outcomes. It covers 26 different jurisdictions, including in-depth reviews of Australia, Chile and Germany.
The report is based in part on a questionnaire that was sent to all participating jurisdictions in January 2011 (see Annex A). All countries were invited to respond to the first question so as to provide an overall context within which the review would take place. The three jurisdictions that were subject to the in-depth review were invited to complete all questions. The report first reviews what is known about the institutional investor landscape including the behavioural codes and legal framework. It then describes what is known about the incentives that condition their actions before considering the record of engagement and voting. The second part comprises the three country reviews. The report was prepared by Grant Kirkpatrick, Héctor Lehuedé and Kenji Hoki with inputs from Simon Wong and Marco Morales and approved for publication under the authority of the OECD Corporate Governance Committee in August 2011. The OECD corporate governance peer review process is designed to facilitate effective implementation of the Principles and to assist market participants and policy makers to respond to emerging corporate governance risks. The reviews are also forward looking so as to help identify, at an early stage, key market practices and policy developments that may undermine the quality of corporate governance. The review process is open to OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions...
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institutional investors. The scope of the exercise is presented in the scoping paper DAF/CA/
CG(2010)12, which is annexed in this questionnaire
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