The Pros And Cons Of Pre-Emptive Intervention

The attacks of September 11 2001 prompted the first major shift in U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War era. Whereas President Clinton had prioritised domestic issues over international affairs during the 1990s, the perceived threat of terrorism post-9/11 led to a highly activist Bush administration intent on supressing the influence of both the “Axis of Evil” (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) and dangerous non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda. The strategy of pre-emptive intervention championed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was central to American foreign policy during this era, as is exemplified by the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
There were several advantages to the United States pursuing this strategy during the early years of the War on Terror. Firstly, and most importantly, it was believed that pre-emptive intervention allowed the U.S. to prevent future attacks on American soil before they could be accomplished. There was certainly a belief among some (particularly those belonging to the neoconservative movement) that the Clinton administration’s hands off approach to both radical Islam and Saddam Hussein’s regime severely weakened the security of the U.S. by showing foreign enemies that the country was not fully committed to fighting against them. After
Terrorism is a broad ideology that is so intertwined in the Middle East with complex and historic religious conflicts and political associations that any attempt made by a Western power to ham-fistedly destroy it with military force will ultimately fail and stir up further resentment in the region. The ending of the Cold War was made possible through the recognition of mutual interests of state actors, yet the Salafism of al-Qaeda and ISIS, together with the rightful unwillingness of the U.S. and its allies to negotiate with unlawful terrorist organisations make a similar solution unworkable in the present