The Gettysburg Battle Analysis

In the beginning of June, 1863, the Confederate army began movement into Pennsylvania. Lee issued his first orders for the northern offensive on June 3rd, “breaking contact with Hooker’s Army of the Potomac near Fredericksburg” (Reardon, 2013). Lee’s forces moved through the Shenandoah Valley, using the Blue Ridge Mountains to conceal their movement into Pennsylvania. Lee used his cavalry Division, led by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart to screen the movement of the rest of the army as it passed over the Blue Ridge Mountains. After crossing the mountains, Gen. Lee ordered to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Union troops, providing a clear path into Pennsylvania. The screening provided by the cavalry was successful, and Gen. Hooker lost contact with the
Prior to converging on Gettysburg Lee had given Gen. Ewell orders to march on Harrisburg (Gottfried, 2010). The order to pull Ewell back from his attack on Harrisburg in order to march on Gettysburg was a result of information gaps which were normally filled by Stuart’s cavalry. Lee had believed the Army of the Potomac was still south of the Potomac River. He ordered Generals Ewell and Longstreet to converge on Gettysburg in an effort to force the Union Army northward, across the Potomac River, into action. If the proper information had been available to Lee, he would have had a better understanding of the tactical
Maj. Gen. Heth’s division was sent to conduct a reconnaissance of the town. Union cavalry was reported to be entering the town from the south (Reardon, 2013). This cavalry, led by Brig. Gen. John Buford was the lead element for the Army of the Potomac. Buford’s cavalry had been sent to Gettysburg to conduct reconnaissance as well, and the contact between the two forces had begun.
The physical terrain was part of the reason for interest in Gettysburg in the first place. Ten roads converged on Gettysburg, making it a key piece of operational terrain. For the Union, denying access to this road junction would greatly degrade the ability of the Confederates to move into a position to threaten Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore, or even Washington D.C. For the Confederates, this road junction delivered a venue to move the army quickly in several directions, thus providing options and mobility at the same time. It would also provide multiple lines of communications and logistics for the Confederate