The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation
The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation1
Robert L. Helmreich, Ashleigh C. Merritt & John A. Wilhelm Department of Psychology Aerospace Crew Research Project The University of Texas at Austin Abstract Changes in the nature of CRM training in commercial aviation are described, including its shift from Cockpit to Crew Resource Management. Validation of the impact of CRM is discussed. Limitations of CRM, including lack of crosscultural generality are considered. An overarching framework that stresses error management to increase acceptance of CRM concepts is presented. The error management approach defines behavioral strategies taught in CRM as error countermeasures that are employed to avoid error, to trap errors committed, and to mitigate the consequences of error. The roots of Crew Resource Management training in the United States are usually traced back to a workshop, Resource Management on the Flightdeck sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1979 (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1980).2 This conference was the outgrowth of NASA research into the causes of air transport accidents. The research presented at this meeting identified the human error aspects of the majority of air crashes as failures of interpersonal communications, decision making, and leadership. At this meeting, the label Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) was applied to the process of training crews to reduce “pilot error” by making better use of the human resources on the flightdeck. Many of the air carriers represented at this meeting left it committed to developing new training programs to enhance the interpersonal aspects of flight operations. Since that time CRM training programs have proliferated in the United States and around the world. Approaches to CRM have also evolved in the years since the NASA meeting. The focus of this paper is on the generations of CRM training that reflect this evolution and on the problems that have been
Robert L. Helmreich, Ashleigh C. Merritt & John A. Wilhelm Department of Psychology Aerospace Crew Research Project The University of Texas at Austin Abstract Changes in the nature of CRM training in commercial aviation are described, including its shift from Cockpit to Crew Resource Management. Validation of the impact of CRM is discussed. Limitations of CRM, including lack of crosscultural generality are considered. An overarching framework that stresses error management to increase acceptance of CRM concepts is presented. The error management approach defines behavioral strategies taught in CRM as error countermeasures that are employed to avoid error, to trap errors committed, and to mitigate the consequences of error. The roots of Crew Resource Management training in the United States are usually traced back to a workshop, Resource Management on the Flightdeck sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1979 (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1980).2 This conference was the outgrowth of NASA research into the causes of air transport accidents. The research presented at this meeting identified the human error aspects of the majority of air crashes as failures of interpersonal communications, decision making, and leadership. At this meeting, the label Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) was applied to the process of training crews to reduce “pilot error” by making better use of the human resources on the flightdeck. Many of the air carriers represented at this meeting left it committed to developing new training programs to enhance the interpersonal aspects of flight operations. Since that time CRM training programs have proliferated in the United States and around the world. Approaches to CRM have also evolved in the years since the NASA meeting. The focus of this paper is on the generations of CRM training that reflect this evolution and on the problems that have been
References: 10 Leadership represents a critical area where training can be effective but a set of rote procedures will not lead to optimum performance (Pettitt & Dunlap, 1997).