The Deepwater Horizon Disaster

The decision making of multiple employees and managers contributed to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. A non-rational model of decision making was utilized which directly contributed to the malfunction of equipment and the death of employees. The non-rational model attempts to explain how decisions are actually made (Kanicki & Kreitz, 2010). The case study focuses on how decisions are actually made rather than how they should have been. Decisions made regarding safety, process, and collaboration between companies are root causes for the crisis. Both the Garbage Can Model and Simon’s Normative model can be associated with the decision making in the case.
The events on the Deepwater Horizon are outcomes of poor decision making by all parties involved. There were more than twenty anomalies documented in the well’s
Production and profit was the main focus of both BP and Transocean. In regards to safety equipment and procedures, satisficing influenced the decision of all parties involved. Satisficing is when a solution is made at the good enough level. Decision regarding safety were executed using the Garbage Can Model. The crews did the best they could with the equipment they had.
Both models of non-rational decision making are present within the case. Conflicts between companies created an atmosphere that lead to disaster. Decisions surrounding safety, processes, equipment, and collaboration created additional conflict. The case study gives several examples of the decision making using the non-rational decision making model.
References
Kanicki & Kreitz (2010). Organizational Behavior, 10th edition. Irwin-McGraw Hill.
Kletz, T. (2010). The root cause of the BP leak. TCE: The Chemical Engineer, (829/830), 3.
Rogerson, M. D., Gottlieb, M. C., Handelsman, M. M., Knapp, S., & Younggren, J. (2011). Nonrational processes in ethical decision making. American Psychologist, 66(7), 614-623.