The After Effects of World War II
Professor O’Neill
Atlantic Worlds II
April 16th 2010
Characterizing the First World War as an epidemic of miscalculation, President John F. Kennedy pondered, “they somehow seemed to tumble into war … through stupidity, individual idiosyncrasies, misunderstandings, and personal complexes of inferiority and grandeur” (49). Reflecting upon these miscalculations, Robert F. Kennedy’s Thirteen Days documents the Cuban Missile Crisis and catalogues the President’s contemplative action amidst potential disaster. Considering the misjudgment that drove conflict in the early twentieth century, and the socio-technological paradigm shift of war, President Kennedy found remedy in the maintenance of open channels of external communication, while regarding the international domino effect of each action, and exhibiting constant skepticism in pursuit of a peaceful resolution. German sociologist Max Weber wrote of the Great War, “this war, with all its ghastliness, is nevertheless grand and wonderful. It is worth experiencing” (EP 768). Embellishing the heroism of warfare, Weber reflects a common acceptance of war in the early twentieth century as one of sport and necessity. However, with the development of nuclear arms came a paradigm shift concerning war and its role amid international powers. Acknowledging the destructive potential of nuclear warfare, Kennedy adamantly stated, “We were not going to misjudge or challenge the other side needlessly, or precipitously push our adversaries into a course of action that was not intended” (75). Using historical precedent as his guide, President Kennedy acts upon the belief that war is rarely intentional, while also recognizing the evolving dynamic of war as one of an arms struggle. The application of this lesson exists in Kennedy’s resolution to utilize quarantine as opposed to armed conflict at the Soviets Union’s initial threat. Foreign ships given orders to retreat would be afforded such an opportunity, any vessel refusing
Atlantic Worlds II
April 16th 2010
Characterizing the First World War as an epidemic of miscalculation, President John F. Kennedy pondered, “they somehow seemed to tumble into war … through stupidity, individual idiosyncrasies, misunderstandings, and personal complexes of inferiority and grandeur” (49). Reflecting upon these miscalculations, Robert F. Kennedy’s Thirteen Days documents the Cuban Missile Crisis and catalogues the President’s contemplative action amidst potential disaster. Considering the misjudgment that drove conflict in the early twentieth century, and the socio-technological paradigm shift of war, President Kennedy found remedy in the maintenance of open channels of external communication, while regarding the international domino effect of each action, and exhibiting constant skepticism in pursuit of a peaceful resolution. German sociologist Max Weber wrote of the Great War, “this war, with all its ghastliness, is nevertheless grand and wonderful. It is worth experiencing” (EP 768). Embellishing the heroism of warfare, Weber reflects a common acceptance of war in the early twentieth century as one of sport and necessity. However, with the development of nuclear arms came a paradigm shift concerning war and its role amid international powers. Acknowledging the destructive potential of nuclear warfare, Kennedy adamantly stated, “We were not going to misjudge or challenge the other side needlessly, or precipitously push our adversaries into a course of action that was not intended” (75). Using historical precedent as his guide, President Kennedy acts upon the belief that war is rarely intentional, while also recognizing the evolving dynamic of war as one of an arms struggle. The application of this lesson exists in Kennedy’s resolution to utilize quarantine as opposed to armed conflict at the Soviets Union’s initial threat. Foreign ships given orders to retreat would be afforded such an opportunity, any vessel refusing