Some people believe positive freedom is truly valuable, do you agree?
1. Some people believe that positive freedom is truly valuable. Are they right? Or have they been misled by a mistaken belief in the existence of a ‘higher’ or ‘ideal’ self?
In this essay I will argue positive freedom is valuable. This is based on the belief that it is valuable, by which I mean something worth having, to be able to control ones irrational desires in order to achieve rational goals. An end I will argue is only achievable through adopting the notion of the ‘higher-self’. Given I will be arguing the existence of the higher-self is a logical entailment of achieving positive freedom, I will therefore be denying the belief in the existence of a higher-self is mistaken.
It should be noted that the higher-self I will be promoting in this essay, should not be conflated with the notion of the ideal self. Berlin argued that man is divided against himself. The higher-self is a part inherent within him that acts rationally, calculating what will satisfy in the long-run, contrasted by the lower self that is a slave to irrational impulses and unbridled passions (Berlin 1969, pp.375). This notion of the higher-self is categorically different from the notion of the ideal self which is metaphysically set apart from man (Miller 2006, pp.3).
To present my argument I will begin by explaining what is meant by positive freedom and why the existence of a higher-self is a logical entailment of this, before moving on to explain why it is valuable.
I will then look at two potential threats to positive freedom’s status as valuable. The first threat is that it commits one to paradoxical conclusions about the way freedom can be increased. I will resolve the paradox, with support from Christman, by clarifying what it is meant by a restraint.
I will then consider the concern that the promotion of self-realisation seems to paradoxically lead to despotism. I will then refute this claim by dissociating positive freedom with monism. To reinforce my rebuttal I will show how
In this essay I will argue positive freedom is valuable. This is based on the belief that it is valuable, by which I mean something worth having, to be able to control ones irrational desires in order to achieve rational goals. An end I will argue is only achievable through adopting the notion of the ‘higher-self’. Given I will be arguing the existence of the higher-self is a logical entailment of achieving positive freedom, I will therefore be denying the belief in the existence of a higher-self is mistaken.
It should be noted that the higher-self I will be promoting in this essay, should not be conflated with the notion of the ideal self. Berlin argued that man is divided against himself. The higher-self is a part inherent within him that acts rationally, calculating what will satisfy in the long-run, contrasted by the lower self that is a slave to irrational impulses and unbridled passions (Berlin 1969, pp.375). This notion of the higher-self is categorically different from the notion of the ideal self which is metaphysically set apart from man (Miller 2006, pp.3).
To present my argument I will begin by explaining what is meant by positive freedom and why the existence of a higher-self is a logical entailment of this, before moving on to explain why it is valuable.
I will then look at two potential threats to positive freedom’s status as valuable. The first threat is that it commits one to paradoxical conclusions about the way freedom can be increased. I will resolve the paradox, with support from Christman, by clarifying what it is meant by a restraint.
I will then consider the concern that the promotion of self-realisation seems to paradoxically lead to despotism. I will then refute this claim by dissociating positive freedom with monism. To reinforce my rebuttal I will show how
Bibliography: Berlin, I., 1969, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, London: Oxford University Press. New ed. in Berlin 2002. Christman, J., 1991, ‘Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom’, Ethics, 101: 343–59. Christman, J., 2005, ‘Saving Positive Freedom’, Political Theory, 33: 79–88. Miller, D 2006 ‘The Liberty Reader’, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Swift, A. 2006 Political Philosophy (Polity Press) Taylor, C., 1979, ‘What 's Wrong with Negative Liberty’, in A. Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, reprinted in Miller 1991. Plato, 380 bc, “The Republic”, edited by Radice.B, (2007), Penguin Classics, London. Word count: 2685