Smith Externalism

Externalist Moral Motivation: A Challenge to Smith’s Internalism By Lindsay Dragland

What motivates us to act morally? Are moral judgements intrinsically motivating, or must they be accompanied by a desire to act? Internalists assert that there is a close connection between moral judgment and motivation, as the motivational force which causes us to act morally is the moral judgement itself. Externalists, on the other hand, deny the assumption that moral judgments generate motivational force, and insist that there need not be a close connection between moral judgment and motivation in order to explain moral motivation. I will argue in support of externalist moral motivation by first disproving the strong version of motivational internalism,
Smith’s internalist argument for moral motivation is based on two claims: 1) If an agent judges that it is right for her to X, then either she is motivated to X, or she is practically irrational; 2) If it is right for agents to X, then there is a reason for those agents to X (Smith, 2007, p. 232). In arguing in support of externalism, my main focus will be on Smith’s first internalist claim which he names ‘the practicality requirement on moral judgment.’ I take this approach because Smith insists that externalists who deny his second internalist claim, ‘rationalism,’ are still able to accept his practicality requirement claim; however, the reverse does not hold because rationalism entails the practicality requirement (Smith, 2007, p.
12). This type of rationalist is able to maintain internalism without giving up cognitivism by taking a purely cognitive approach to motivational internalism in which moral judgments express beliefs, and the logical assumption that motivation requires desire is rejected. So, this version claims that beliefs alone are what motivate us to act, and if we insist on ascribing to the person who acts on her moral beliefs a desire to do such an act, then that ascribed desire is a mere consequence of the interpretation that her action was intentional (Brink, 1997, p. 13). While this view is a slightly better take on internalism than the view previously described, it too is problematic. Consider a version of my previous example in which my friend asks me if her pants make her look fat: I believe that my friend’s pants do make her look fat; I sincerely believe that I ought not lie; I want to help my friend look better, even though she might be insulted at first; I believe that telling my friend the truth will help her look better; so, I tell my friend the truth. Maybe I could agree with McDowell and say that the desire to tell my friend the truth was merely ascribed to me as a consequence of my intentional action to tell the truth. I cannot, however, agree with McDowell that the motivation for my action of telling my