Separation Of Powers Vs Federalism
The separation of powers and federalism are the two major foundational elements within the US Constitution. Behind the rationales of the separation of powers and federalism in the United States is ultimately to ensure liberty, stability and harmony amongst the people within the United States, by preventing the consolidation and concentration of power within government, contributing to what we see as American exceptionalism today. In this paper, I will discuss how the differing historical contexts in which the separation of powers and federalism took root, which has determined the design of the Constitution to create horizontal and vertical self-regulatory mechanisms that prevent the problem of tyranny. Next, I present how the negative perception
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This contributes to the idea of the pure separation of powers within the three branches of government, because of the fear of the monarchy at the time of the First Founding and the Anti-Federalist idea that self-interest was human nature that could be kept under control but not rooted out (Kenyon 1955, 15). However, with the end of the monarchy, there was the realization that tyranny can come from not only the monarchy, but by both the few and the many (Federalist #51). As Madison puts it, ambition is part of human nature, and by allowing the ambition of one to be kept in check by the ambition of another by giving each branch a little bit of the power of the other branch, this natural propensity to accumulate power can be utilized as a self-regulating mechanism within the Constitution (Federalist #51). Under Articles of Confederation, the state legislature was the most powerful, because they controlled the federal government (which lacked the power of the purse), but they were not immune from the problem of tyranny by families who controlled the state elite and represented only factional interests, and by extension factionalism of the entire union. This gave rise to blended separatism, as Federalism calls for the harmony between the different sections of government power, giving each branch a little power belonging to the other branches; for example, the legislative branch holding some executive power through the ability to make treaties. By doing so, the pursuit for the common good is established by a strong power instead of the selfish quest for power among the factions (Lim, 15 September 2015), as the other as interdependent factors weeds out the excessive ambition of one branch,
This contributes to the idea of the pure separation of powers within the three branches of government, because of the fear of the monarchy at the time of the First Founding and the Anti-Federalist idea that self-interest was human nature that could be kept under control but not rooted out (Kenyon 1955, 15). However, with the end of the monarchy, there was the realization that tyranny can come from not only the monarchy, but by both the few and the many (Federalist #51). As Madison puts it, ambition is part of human nature, and by allowing the ambition of one to be kept in check by the ambition of another by giving each branch a little bit of the power of the other branch, this natural propensity to accumulate power can be utilized as a self-regulating mechanism within the Constitution (Federalist #51). Under Articles of Confederation, the state legislature was the most powerful, because they controlled the federal government (which lacked the power of the purse), but they were not immune from the problem of tyranny by families who controlled the state elite and represented only factional interests, and by extension factionalism of the entire union. This gave rise to blended separatism, as Federalism calls for the harmony between the different sections of government power, giving each branch a little power belonging to the other branches; for example, the legislative branch holding some executive power through the ability to make treaties. By doing so, the pursuit for the common good is established by a strong power instead of the selfish quest for power among the factions (Lim, 15 September 2015), as the other as interdependent factors weeds out the excessive ambition of one branch,