Publius argues the necessity of a separation of powers in the new government in order to provide the necessary stability and energy while protecting the republican …show more content…
Montesquieu argument for the separation of powers, “he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other” (270). In Federalist paper #48, describes how the Federal Constitution provides a defense through a blend of the branches of government. In class, we discuss that in order to make the separation of powers work there is a need to find a way that the legislative branch does not take power from the executive. He provides examples of Virginia and Pennsylvania in which the powers of the legislative were not protected against and the executive branch was usurped by the legislative. In class, we also discuss that there were three important things that prevent legislature to intimidate and control the behavior of the executive which means Congress controls over the President. First, elections which nor the president or the congress can control them, there are elected independently. Second, Salaries which means that there are fixed and cannot be altered, and finally the division of powers and the presidential veto, which it creates two different chambers the house and the …show more content…
Regarding the legislative branch, he suggests that the branch should be split into the two distinct houses with one having more of the dependence and close to the people than the other. As the legislative branch is closest to the people, it is proper that is divided so it limits the closeness with the people. In Federalist papers #52 to #58 the first branch of the legislative, Madison described is the House of Representatives, which it is designed to be the most dependent on the people. “As it is essential to liberty that the government, in general, should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people” (295). In class, we discuss that the House should be as democratic as possible. It suggests the short durations of powers as to 2 years better than 1, Madison described as safe and useful. The House of Representatives will be watched not only by the people through its direct dependence on them, but also by the collateral branch of the