Rommel's Invasion Of Normandy

The Allies invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944 was the beginning of the end for Hitler's Third Reich. Hans Von Luck served throughout the war in the service of Germany, and was able to view the invasion in a unique Position as commander of Kampfgruppe von Luck. In reading his Book "panzer commander" Von Luck presents his opinions on the battle and its outcome, and I will attempt to analyze Von Luck's thoughts on D-Day invasion. The German High command had three different opinions on how the Allied invasion should be counteracted. First, there was Rommel's Plan, this plan would have the bulk of the German Army close to the invasion point, which Rommel believed would be in Normandy, to quickly push the Allies off their beach head and back
The draw back to this course of action would be that if the invasion were to come at the point/ Pas de Calais, which the majority of the German high command believed than the bulk of the armor reserves would be too far back to effectively counter attack. In direct Opposition to Rommel's plan was Rundstedt’s. This plan called for the armored reserves to be held back and wait for the Allies to become fixed inland and then launch an attack in Masse and destroy the allied army. Second, Rundstedt pursued the traditional method with this strategy, and it had been used successfully on the eastern front against the Russians, but air superiority had not been as much of a factor as much it would be in Normandy.
In his writings he details three major reason why the Germans lost battle. First, the German forces were ordered to standby and conduct NO major offensive operations. Starting on the night of the 5th and over the next few days Von Luck was Ordered not to attack except in some limited operations, and due to this believed that a chance to disrupt the airborne operations and early inland operations. Second, the lack of the "1000" fighters which was promised by Going allowed for the Allies to have unlimited dominance of the air above Normandy. As before Going's promise had failed the German army in a time of need, and due this the allies through air power were able disrupt the German reinforcement, resupply, and command & control. Finally, Von Luck believed that Hitler's withholding of the Panzer divisions doomed the ability of the Germans to push the allies back into the sea, and win the battle. Without the extra power of these divisions the Germans ability to