Racial Kinship Debate

When an individual decides to take race into account, there are two modes by which he or she may do so. The first form is undeniably destructive – for example, a shopkeeper keeping harsher surveillance over Black customers than White customers, or a real estate agent reserving nicer neighborhoods only for his White clients. The majority of Americans would concur that the first form of racism is unquestionably immoral. This method of taking race into account is generally identified as "racism" in contemporary usage, and for the purposes of this paper, will serve as our definition. The second form of taking race into account, called "racial kinship", is when members of a particular race treat members of his or her own race with more benevolence than he or she would treat someone outside of his or her own race. Although both forms of taking race into account involve treating people differently based on race, racial kinship, unlike (our definition of) racism, is not entirely destructive in practice. A prevalent question in the arena of Black philosophy is, "should Blacks treat Blacks with more benevolence than they do those who are not Black?" Philosophers like W.E.B. Du Bois reason that racial kinship is a morally acceptable practice because it is used for emancipatory purposes. Concurrently, scholars like Anthony Appiah completely reject taking race into account on the grounds that race is a social construct that lacks any real definition. Appiah 's answer to racial kinship is "to be absolutely clear that race is a human invention and to resist granting race a life of its own" (Anna Stubblefield, 87). He rejects racial kinship because he finds that racial distinctions do not exist independently of human perception and belief, or in other words, race is not "real". In "Ethics Along the Color Line", race philosopher Anna Stubblefield asserts that although race is socially constructed, race still carries very real significance in society. She uses the analogy of how money, although created by human beings, nonetheless has value in modern civilization – and therefore should be taken seriously. Stubblefield continues on to say that the reality of race is a but a minor issue, because "those who advocate taking race into account must do more than simply establish that race is real. They must give further arguments for why it is morally acceptable" (Stubblefield, 89). As this line of reasoning is understood to be justifiable, we must consider the morality of racial kinship independent of seeing race as a reality. Regardless of whether or not we ascribe race a verifiable existence, it is easy to understand why racial kinship is a morally justifiable practice among African-Americans in an oppressive society.
It is unnecessary to oppose any argument made on the basis that race has no "real" value. Appiah, who argues against racial kinship on the grounds that race is not real is, in effect, saying that if race were to be real, then taking race would then be acceptable. By making the validity of racial kinship dependent on the reality of race, he indirectly undermines his arguments, especially in the event that race is somehow discovered to be "real". In the debate on whether racial kinship is moral, it is important to move beyond questioning race 's reality, because any answer would be inconclusive in the philosophical debate on racial kinship 's morality.
Nonetheless, we must examine the role that race plays in triggering one 's decision to practice racial kinship, and how our acts are based on interpretations of different races. This understanding is important because even before we treat people differently based on race, we must first identify what race someone belongs to. Thusly, at a rudimentary level, racial kinship is predicated on racial classification. The social construction that we call "race", is a classification of individuals based solely, or at least initially, on physical appearance. For example, when we first encounter a person, we attribute them a racial identity based on qualities of their appearance such as skin color, hair texture, facial structure, and more. Because of the apparent superficiality of this practice, it is understandable as to why philosophers would try to move away from using race as a basis for judgment. In his attempt to correctly categorize people into racial groups, W.E.B. Du Bois writes, "all these physical characteristics are patent enough, and if they agreed with each other it would be very easy to classify mankind. Unfortunately for scientists, however, these criteria of race are exasperatingly intermingled" (Du Bois, 229l). However, I argue that the correct classification of an individual into his or her correct racial group is unnecessary. A Black woman (Black by ancestry and/or family lineage) who looks White will be treated as if she were White. Conversely, a man who is technically White but does not meet held standards of White identity will not be afforded the same privileges as a White-looking man would be. With this example, we can see how greatly the significance of one 's appearance is underestimated; and that race, in essence, is really based on outward appearances.
Despite racial classification being based primarily on physical characteristics, we cannot simply dismiss racial identity as a practice that lacks substance. From the prior example we can see that the way someone appears influences how they will be treated by others, and therefore, that the way we look is important. Variations in the physical appearance of humans are believed by anthropologists to be an important factor in the development of personality and social relations. Beyond interactions based on race, physical characteristics and human interpretation of them are vital parts of our understanding of beauty, the development of self-esteem, and the formation of our physical attractiveness to potential partners. How a person looks (independent of what race he or she is), already holds a key place in how each person treats another. And so, we can deduce that the inclusion of race as an identification method is legitimate, specifically for Black people. Black people can use race to identify with one another for solidarity. Identifying with people that look like you (whether it 's because they have the same hairstyle as you or the same skin color) is a legitimate action. Additionally, identification based on physical appearance is made even more justifiable if you and those who look like you have been oppressed for your physical attributes. If the greater society has stigmatized a group of individuals who share common features, traits, or physical appearances, then solidarity amongst this group is a reasonable means to collectively combating such oppression. Scholar and advocate of racial kinship Lucius T. Outlaw confirms, "that both struggles against racism and individious ethnocentrism… requires the conservation of races" (Lucius T. Outlaw, 157). Among people who share commonalities, or more specifically – races, racial kinship is ethical because it is necessary for race to play a significant role in countering racial oppression. Opponents of racial kinship may argue that legitimating racial identity based on common appearances leads to wide-ranging definitions of what characteristics constitute membership to certain racial groups. Stubblefield includes that although scientists find racial differences "very superficial… insignificant differences in skin color, hair texture, and so on that do not indicate any more significant differences between people" (Stubblefield, 71), historically, even noted scientists have erroneously linked differences in personal appearance, such as skeletal shape, with race. This argument against racial kinship would indicate that racial kinship cannot be based upon race because race itself may have wrongly attributed a race with an attribute that is not true to the majority of the race. For example, Stubblefield cites Dutch anatomist Petrus Camper, who argued that skull measurements of Blacks were most like that of an ape 's; and Paul Broca, who suggested that the bone structure Black people was more "apelike" and primitive. To this contention, I would argue that different cultures place different degrees of emphasis on physical appearance and its importance to social status and other phenomena, so questions as to how real race or racial classification is can be expected - this is one of the drawbacks of race lacking any "real" definition. Yet, it is unimportant as to what qualities constitute a group 's classification, (be the classification true or false). It is instead, more important that, if a specific race is grouped by an oppressive majority, they should band together; and if they deem the qualities that classify them as a group baseless, then they should work collectively at dispelling the categorization as an untrue generalization. For instance, if a scientist believes that all Black people have lower intellectual capacities, then it would be most effective for Blacks to work cooperatively at dispelling this assumption. Otherwise, simply rejecting race identity would not change everyone else 's assumption that because you are Black you are less intelligent. Even if the categorizations that form a racial group are inaccurate, if those individuals placed into that group are oppressed because of that quality, it is essential for them to collectively identify and work together to end resulting oppression.
Returning, though, to race as the primary focus of our debate, we can understand that given its social, historical and political relevance in the past and in the present, race ought to have a place in how Blacks treat other Blacks. Stubblefield asserts, "discussions of whether or not we should take race into account in our moral reasoning must be grounded in the history and contemporary manifestation of white supremacy" (Stubblefield, 69). America has socially separated its citizens into groups based upon races, and has formed a White patriarchal government. When you look at the history of US Presidents, the collection of state and federal politicians, the grouping of millionaires, and the executives of the top-grossing companies, it is obvious that the access to power, wealth, and opportunity is disproportionately given to Whites in Americans. White citizens (particularly males) are undoubtedly granted privileges and access to power, while Blacks are, and have been, continually exploited, stigmatized and denied a vessel for upward mobility in the American social climate. This systematic denial of opportunities to minorities is a result of oppression. As a means of combating oppression, socially subordinated racial and ethnic groups should collectively draw on their own cultures and identify themselves as one race; these ties create a sense of pride and identity that provide crucial support for coping with widespread discrimination from Whites. The historical experience of Blacks in America and the persistence of racism is ample reason for Blacks as a group to identify closer with one another than with those of another race.
W. E. B. Du Bois, in "The Conservation of Races", urged for a familiar kinship conception of "Blackness" on the basis that race is like a family. The "race is family" metaphor makes each Black person a family member whose interests are seen as closely and unavoidably connected to the interests of all other members of the family (i.e., the Black race), which is why Du bois feels Blacks should work towards "the development of these race groups, not as individuals, but as races" (Du Bois, 233). However, this analogy is flawed. A frequent argument against Black racial solidarity draws more upon the family model, stating that racial kinship forces the expectation that uniquely different people should all band together because of one inborn trait they all share. Race philosopher Randall Kennedy shares this view, voicing that racial kinship denies him the ability to be "freed from the sanctions of custom and tradition and inherited status, unbound by moral ties antecedent to choice" – a description of what political theorist Michael Sandel calls the "unencumbered self" (Randall Kennedy, 510). Kennedy would argue that the Black race contains a wide array of different types of people, occupying different locations in socio-economic levels, of different religions, and of different political interests. And so, to expect all of the people of a single race to come to one accord is unrealistic, because Black people may be more different from one another than they are alike. This statement is true. Some Blacks are rich; some Blacks are poor. Some Blacks live in government housing facilities; Some Blacks live in luxurious mansions. Black people vary widely on many levels of existence, and so to attempt to align such a wide array of individuals through common political interest is an undependable motivation for racial kinship. However, racial solidarity does not call for all Blacks to share the same point of view for everything. Tommie Shelby, in an essay called "Black Solidarity after Black Power", introduces a better basis for Black racial kinship, founded in political terms. He writes, "we must distinguish between the interests that Blacks share because they are Black (such as combating racial discrimination) and the interests that some Blacks may happen to share for reasons unrelated to their Blackness (such as securing low-cost health care) (Tommie Shelby, 54). Shelby distinguishes the importance of acknowledging that racial kinship is only logical wherein Blacks are aligned on issues arising from their group 's oppression. Racial kinship acts, not as a method of expecting Blacks to become a monolithic entity; it is a tool by which Blacks can collectively combat anti-Black oppression.
Black racial kinship is both important and essential to the discontinuation of White supremacy. Blacks, having been stigmatized, exploited, and degraded by an oppressive majority, need to use the strength found in solidarity to fight off the damages done by anti-Black attitudes. Race, and differences between races, has been the cause of such oppression. Questioning the reality of race is unnecessary, for one can never undo what race has done in the context of those who see it as a reality. Racial kinship is a morally justifiable practice among African-Americans in an oppressive society, regardless of whether or not we can label it as "real". The question is not whether race is real or not, it is how we as a society are going to deal with the very real outcomes that racism has caused.

References

Appiah, K. Anthony. 1990. "Racisms." In Anatomy of Racism, ed. David Theo Goldberg, 3-17. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Du Bois. W. E.B. 1997. "The Conservation of Races." In The Souls of Black Folk, ed. David W. Blight and Robert Gooding-Williams, 228-238. Boston: Bedford.

Shelby, Tommie. 2005. "Black Solidarity After Black Power". In We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity.

Stubblefield, Anna. 2005. Ethics along the Color Line. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Outlaw, Lucius. 1996. On Race and Philosophy. New York: Routledge.

References: Appiah, K. Anthony. 1990. "Racisms." In Anatomy of Racism, ed. David Theo Goldberg, 3-17. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Du Bois. W. E.B. 1997. "The Conservation of Races." In The Souls of Black Folk, ed. David W. Blight and Robert Gooding-Williams, 228-238. Boston: Bedford. Shelby, Tommie. 2005. "Black Solidarity After Black Power". In We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity. Stubblefield, Anna. 2005. Ethics along the Color Line. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Outlaw, Lucius. 1996. On Race and Philosophy. New York: Routledge.