Quining Qualia Dennett Summary
The philosophy of mind is no stranger to rather abstract philosophical terms and concepts. Usually, these terms are defined to better understand a philosophical theory, or to describe a flaw in one of those theories. Qualia is a product of the latter category. However, the existence of qualia has been called into question by Daniel Dennett in his article Quining Qualia. This paper will be exploring the claims Dennett made about the existence of qualia in three parts. First, by defining the five qualities that Dennett observes as being attributed to the term qualia. Then, summarizing Dennett’s four primary arguments by highlighting an example of each that shows his conclusion. Finally, I will provide my personal thoughts on his arguments, and
…show more content…
Dennett says “Why does it seem that our conscious experiences have ineffable properties? Because they do have practically ineffable properties” (Dennett pg.241) which he then supports with an example. Here, Dennett supposes that he has never heard the call of an osprey, but he is an avid reader of books about birds including the osprey. Even so, without hearing the bird firsthand, he lacks qualia of the sound, regardless of how in depth those books describe the osprey’s call. So, Dennett tracks down one of these birds and listens to its call. Now he has firsthand experience with the sound, and at first it appears to be ineffable, as the books written by experts in the field of avian biology failed to fully capture the experience. However, Dennett claims this first-hand experience is in fact a property-detector, which allows him to now better identify the call of an osprey. Which means, Dennett can properly identify all the properties of an osprey call, given enough experiences hearing ospreys. Then, he would be able to properly quantify the sound in words. No doubt that full definition would be extremely lengthy, but it would be a perfectly accurate description of a conscious experience. Which clearly contradicts the idea that such experiences have ineffable
Dennett says “Why does it seem that our conscious experiences have ineffable properties? Because they do have practically ineffable properties” (Dennett pg.241) which he then supports with an example. Here, Dennett supposes that he has never heard the call of an osprey, but he is an avid reader of books about birds including the osprey. Even so, without hearing the bird firsthand, he lacks qualia of the sound, regardless of how in depth those books describe the osprey’s call. So, Dennett tracks down one of these birds and listens to its call. Now he has firsthand experience with the sound, and at first it appears to be ineffable, as the books written by experts in the field of avian biology failed to fully capture the experience. However, Dennett claims this first-hand experience is in fact a property-detector, which allows him to now better identify the call of an osprey. Which means, Dennett can properly identify all the properties of an osprey call, given enough experiences hearing ospreys. Then, he would be able to properly quantify the sound in words. No doubt that full definition would be extremely lengthy, but it would be a perfectly accurate description of a conscious experience. Which clearly contradicts the idea that such experiences have ineffable