In 1993, after enjoying continuous explosive growth for 10 years, Dell absented from the portable computer market because of its informality in product development. Though delivered several successful products with a free-wheeling development structure in the early nineties, the company suffered from the inconsistent process and the unpredictable result. Several other problems involved the depressing performance in the retail market, the lack of capable senior management and early setback in portable computers also contributed to the sagging situation. In order to shorten the decision-making period, the management team reorganized the product development process to six phases: profile phase, planning phase, implementation phase, qualification phase, launch phase and acceptance phase. To capture back the market share and rebuild the Dell legendary, the company would like to differentiate the new generation of Dell portables through battery life. The new LiOn technology being developed at Sony was promised to largely extended battery time but it was not yet matured. Whether to adopt the new but unproven powering technology, or to stick to the mature battery technology, or if there was another option that would compromise, became an issue on the table.
Option 1: Continue with a proven battery technology (NiHi)
No doubtful this the most reliable option: proven technology, stable product, no one would be blamed for. Traditional batteries could ensure Dell a good product. Functions and performance of the mature technology were predictable, which made the result less risky. With 100% confidence on the technology, the company could realize a predicted net margin of $485 million. However, as a laggar in the portable computer market, this conservative attitude would not help Dell to win back the lost market share. In an increasingly competitive market, delivering bourgeois products equaled to putting yourself in the position of chronic death. Adding a second battery...
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