Political Conception Of Justice Analysis

Realizing the limits of Neutrality as the sole basis for a Political Conception of justice, Rawls argues for the importance of a conception of primary goods as the basis for the respect of equal persons. Rawls argues that a well laid our political conception of justice will “ensure to the extent that is humanly possible to do so that the political process – that is, not only the right to vote, but also the opportunity to hold public office and influence political decisions – remains equally accessible to all (Rawls 42). In doing so, it will also guard against the prevalence of illiberal policies and the establishment of a tyranny of the majority insofar as the political conception safeguards the rights and liberties of every individual. The
A shared idea of rational advantage as Rawl’s puts it, is the belief that:

Citizens affirm the same political conception of themselves as free and equal persons; and… that their (permissible) conceptions of the good, however distinct their content and their related religious and philosophical doctrines, require for their advancement roughly the same primary goods, that is, the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, and the same all-purpose means such as income and wealth with all these supported by the same social basis for self-respect (Rawls 180)

The presumed presence of this “Shared Idea” serves as the basis for the notion that a political conception of justice can provide meaningful publicly acceptable way of measuring validity of citizens claims in relation to questions of political justice. This
The primary goods will not be of equal value to every individual. Though the goods are the same (liberties, rights, opportunity etc.) the usefulness is going to be different depending on the situation of the individual. The value of any primary good is a function of the means that individual has at his disposal of making the most use of that primary good (Young and Rawls). Therefore, those with greater means will be able to make better use of their primary goods that are guaranteed for all by the conception of justice that we arrive at in the original position. Rawls then places the onus on individuals by claiming that it is up to them to align their expectations with their current situations to adequately reflect “the all-purpose means they can expect, given their present and foreseeable situation” (Rawls 189). Therefore, if an individual lacks the “all-purpose means” to secure his preferences, then it is that person’s responsibility to adjust his preferences so that he will be able to achieve realistic goals given his circumstances (Young; Rawls 189-93). This is to illustrate the fact that a conception of justice is not unjust just because citizens hold unrealistic expectations. Although this seems perfectly reasonable, it poses one problem that Rawls was trying to avoid from the outset. The expectation that citizens will