Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance and firm Performance in Textile Sector of Pakistan

Course Title
Business research methods

Assignment
Research proposal
Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance and firm Performance in
Textile Sector of Pakistan

Submitted to
Dr.Yasir Kamal

Submitted by
Farhan Akbar

Program
Msc. Finance

Semester
3rd

Dated:
5th of May 2014

Table of Contents

1. Introduction...........................................................................................................3
2. Literature Review……………….……………………………………………………...3
3. Objective of Research...……………………………………………………………….4
4. Research Methodology………………………………………………………………..4
4.2 Data type and sampling……………………………………………………………...5
5. Analysis of data………………………………………………………………….……...5
6. References……………………………………………………………………………..6

1. INTRODUCTION:
The definition of corporate governance differs from country to country. For the case of Continental European countries such as Germany, the term refers to all the stakeholders of a firm while for Anglo-American countries corporate governance focuses on generating a fair return for investors (see Goergen, Manjon and Renneboog, 2005). The corporate governance devices utilized to ensure economic efficiency include among others shareholder monitoring, creditor monitoring, executive remuneration contracts, dividend policy and the regulatory framework of the corporate law regime and the stock exchanges.
The increasing international integration, deregulation and technological development and the resulting challenges are calling for a review of national corporate governance systems. Countries that are in dire need of external financing require stronger and effective corporate governance systems. Pakistan’s failure to attract external finance
– some of it from foreign investors – may be largely attributed to weak investor protection.
The nature of relation between the ownership structure and corporate governance structure

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