Outline Of Rowe's Argument

Outline of Rowe's Chapter on the Argument from Contingency in His Philosophy of Religion, Part II
Notes on Rowe on the Cosmological Argument, Part Two: Four Criticisms of the Argument

0. Review
0.1 Dependent beings: a being whose existence is accounted for by the causal activity of other beings
0.2 Self-existent beings: beings whose existence is self-explanatory, or accounted for by their own inner nature
0.3 The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): There must be an explanation for (a) the existence of every object, and (b) of every positive fact whatsoever, either in terms of something else or in terms of its own inner nature.
0.4 The basic argument:

1. Either everything is a dependent being, or there is a self-existent being.
Therefore, there is a self-existent being.

1. First Criticism: Dependence and the fallacy of composition
1.1 The argument fallaciously assumes that because each member of the collection of beings within the universe is dependent, that therefore the whole collection of such beings is itself dependent. But this doesn’t follow.
1.2 Reply: It would be fallacious to assume this, but the defender of the cosmological argument need not assume it for the argument to work. Rather, since the existence of the collection of dependent beings is a positive fact, then it follows from PSR(b) that there must be a sufficient reason for why the collection exists.
2. Second Criticism: Causation and the fallacy of composition
2.1 The argument fallaciously assumes that because each member of the collection of dependent beings has a cause, that therefore the whole collection of dependent beings has a cause. But this doesn’t follow.
2.2 Reply: It would be fallacious to assume this, but the defender of the cosmological argument need not assume it for the argument to work. Rather, since the existence of the collection of dependent beings is a positive fact, then it follows from PSR(b) that there must be a sufficient reason for why the collection
Rowe explains that the PSR has two parts. First, the PSR requires that there be an explanation for the existence of any being; thus, for any being that exists, the PSR demands that one be able to point to the cause of that being. Second, the PSR requires that there be an explanation for "any positive fact whatever."� To illustrate how the PSR operates with the Cosmological Argument, Rowe begins by describing the only three ways in which the existence of a being might be explained: it might be explained by another being (in which case it would be a dependent being on Clarke's account); it might be explained by itself (in which case it would be an independent being on Clarke's account); and it might be explained by nothing (which is unaccounted for on Clarke's account). Now, the PSR (specifically the first part of the PSR) is what justifies Clarke's assertion that all beings fit into the first two of these categories; that is, because the PSR demands that there be an explanation for any being, it is not possible for there to be no explanation for the existence of a being. Thus follows Clarke's premise that every extant being must be either dependent or independent. But this does not suffice to show that the Cosmological Argument is sound, for it could be that every extant being is