Ostpolitik
1
"Ostpolitik as a source of intra-bloc tensions" by Dr. Oliver Bange, Mannheim University (Project "Ostpolitik and Détente")
[Ostpolitik caused friction on a number of different levels – it sparked tensions within Willy
Brand’s party, the SPD, parliament, the coalition cabinet, tensions with the Western allies, and even within the Eastern bloc. It is the latter two that this paper is devoted, arranging documents from various national archives around nine distinct but interconnected arguments.
Inevitably, such a vue d’ensemble has to start with an explanation of the goals and tactics underlying the new Eastern policy as devised during Brandt’s time as foreign minister of the
“Grand Coalition” from December 1966 to September 1969, and put into practice during his chancellorship of the social-liberal coalition until 1974 and then onwards to the CSCE in
Helsinki on August 1, 1975.]
One might compare the "Neue Ostpolitik" of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr with a coin: the currency, or ultimate goal, imprinted on it is called "unification" – in order to avoid any compromise to the original borders of the vanished Reich, Brandt refused to speak about "reunification", preferring the "unification" or "Zusammenwachsen" (growing closer) of the two existing German states. The two sides of the coin represent two long-term strategies to achieve unification. Undermining Communism by exposing the people under its rule to
Western values and liberties was one side of the coin. However, the eventual breakdown of
Communism itself would not guarantee German unification. The other side of the coin was therefore to devise an all-European security system, taking care of the legitimate security concerns of all nations (including the United States and the Soviet Union) concerned by a prospective unification of the two German states. This, and only this it was argued at the time, could possibly ease the way to unification after an eventual collapse of
"Ostpolitik as a source of intra-bloc tensions" by Dr. Oliver Bange, Mannheim University (Project "Ostpolitik and Détente")
[Ostpolitik caused friction on a number of different levels – it sparked tensions within Willy
Brand’s party, the SPD, parliament, the coalition cabinet, tensions with the Western allies, and even within the Eastern bloc. It is the latter two that this paper is devoted, arranging documents from various national archives around nine distinct but interconnected arguments.
Inevitably, such a vue d’ensemble has to start with an explanation of the goals and tactics underlying the new Eastern policy as devised during Brandt’s time as foreign minister of the
“Grand Coalition” from December 1966 to September 1969, and put into practice during his chancellorship of the social-liberal coalition until 1974 and then onwards to the CSCE in
Helsinki on August 1, 1975.]
One might compare the "Neue Ostpolitik" of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr with a coin: the currency, or ultimate goal, imprinted on it is called "unification" – in order to avoid any compromise to the original borders of the vanished Reich, Brandt refused to speak about "reunification", preferring the "unification" or "Zusammenwachsen" (growing closer) of the two existing German states. The two sides of the coin represent two long-term strategies to achieve unification. Undermining Communism by exposing the people under its rule to
Western values and liberties was one side of the coin. However, the eventual breakdown of
Communism itself would not guarantee German unification. The other side of the coin was therefore to devise an all-European security system, taking care of the legitimate security concerns of all nations (including the United States and the Soviet Union) concerned by a prospective unification of the two German states. This, and only this it was argued at the time, could possibly ease the way to unification after an eventual collapse of