Operation Planning Process Analysis

The efficacious exertion and incorporation of the military instrument of power into design methodologies, in tandem with other government entities, focused on solving wicked problems is the overall objective of the military arm of government. Scrutinizing policy objectives with creative thinking and ongoing analysis in order to continually frame the problem and develop/revise plans that will apply the best possible doctrine at the highest levels is the intent.
Military planners for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the 2003 U.S. military action against Iraq, allowed the civilian leadership to dictate how the military should fight. Instead of military planners planning for what policy makers wanted the military to accomplish, policy makers directed
military planning and execution for OIF from 2002 to 2007 and will evaluate how well military leaders interpreted civilian guidance, understood the operational environment, and defined the problem. This essay will also evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the operational design, operational art, and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) used in the planning and execution of OIF from 2002 to 2007. Assessments are made of General Casey’s reframing and General Petraeus’ surge strategies. An analysis of OIF lessons learned analyzes the strengths, weaknesses, and trends that may be relevant for future
Rumsfeld’s military end state objectives and his overall intent communicated often and explicitly to military planners how to implement this new operational approach and was, overall, very effective when executed up to phase IV. However, his conveyed desire for a quick operational victory over the enemy forces and functions using a smaller footprint, precision weapons, innovation of civil affairs and psychological operations, and shock/awe prerogatives were time driven rather than condition-driven terms. Rumsfeld was attempting to change the paradigm of how the U.S. fights and he wanted to do it quickly and without anyone questioning or carefully evaluating his approach. Clearly, Colonel Macgregor and his book, “Breaking the Phalanx,” heavily influenced Rumsfeld and Rumsfeld spread that influence quietly throughout the senior operational planning leadership specifically attempting to influence General Franks and the CENTCOM staff to this paradigm shift. Another example of unnecessary and, ultimately, harmful change was Rumsfeld’s decision to arbitrarily do away with the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) in order to lower the force capabilities requested by component commanders. Rumsfeld cutting the TPFDL flow essentially prevented military leadership