Operation Husky Military Analysis

The Allied Forces sought to perform joint operations during Operation HUSKY, but the joint operational concepts taken for granted today were underdeveloped in 1943. The awkward attempt by the Allies to command and control this operation combined with the unfamiliar practice of integrating joint functions prevented the Allies from fully from recognizing and exploiting the opportunities for decisive action on Sicily. This paper first evaluates the operational level command and control of Operation HUSKY against the three attributes of mission command, generally finding underdeveloped intent and gaps in trust and understanding. Secondly, it evaluates the integration of two joint functions, fires and intelligence, finding that both functions were
and Eight British Armies’ Commanders understood what Roosevelt and Churchill wanted, but other key operational commanders did not. In other words, British General Bernard Montgomery and U.S. Lieutenant General George Patton understood the initial intent of Operation HUSKY, but they recognized the opportunities and realized the importance of defeating the German Army. According to modern doctrine, “the thorough understanding of the commander’s intent at every level” is essential to mission command; furthermore, “commander’s intent fosters communication and understanding with all subordinates.” Additionally, understanding gives operational commanders the required “insight and foresight” to make good decisions, manage risk, and to reflect on future effects. It’s been noted that General Eisenhower allowed subordinate headquarters in geographically separated locations, which complicated mission command. This contributed to the lack of understanding at the supreme commander level; in turn, Eisenhower’s headquarters remained blind to the developing opportunities in Sicily and unable to integrate air and sea power to spoil the German escape. The race for Messina wasn’t just a competition between Allied rivals; it was an attempt at decisive action. Patton demonstrated this understanding by launching a series of amphibious assaults to get ahead of the German’s exit of Sicily. Conversely, the lack
The joint fires function is coordinated action in support of a common objective to produce desired results which are delivered during the employment of forces from multiple components. With the absence of the Sherman Tank and the subsequent lack of land-delivered firepower during their initial landings onto Sicily, the Seventh U.S. Army’s call for air support went unfulfilled; instead, some elements of the Allied Naval Forces’ Western Task Force moved closer to shore to provide ship to shore fires. This integration of naval fires would be repeated by the Allies along the northern coast of Sicily protecting one of Patton’s divisions and assuring logistics forward of Palermo. The German Luftwaffe lost about 40% of its aircraft before Operation HUSKY began and the Allies gained an air superiority of roughly two and a half Allied aircraft to each Axis aircraft; yet, the Allies failed to integrate fires to negate German air attacks that caused significant damage to several Allied ships. Joint fires integration met the standard in terms of providing joint fire support from maritime forces during the initial landings on Sicily, while other fires integration did not; thus, joint fires were not fully integrated with joint protection, nor with movement and maneuver. Lastly,