Nietzsche: the Conscience
Nietzsche: The Conscience
In his second essay of the Geneaology of Morals, Nietzsche attempts to identify and explain the origin of the conscience. He does not adopt the view of the conscience that is accepted by the “English Psychologists”, such as Bentham, J. Mill, J.S. Mill and Hume, as the result of an innate moral feeling. Rather, it is his belief that the moral content of our conscience is formed during childhood under the influence of society. Nietzsche defines the conscience as an introspective phenomenon brought about by a feeling of responsibility, in which one analyzes their own morality due to the internalization of the values of society. This definition holds the position that the conscience is not something innate to humans, rather it has arisen through evolution. In light of this, this paper will give insight into how Nietzsche reaches this conclusion, as well as what results from it. In order to do this there will be discussion of guilt, punishment, the will to power and implications from society.
The way in which we currently view guilt is as having an association with accountability and responsibility. To hold a promise; one is required to have a trained and able memory, and to have a confidence in one’s own predictability. Society and morality allow us to make ourselves predictable by providing a common set of laws and customs to guide behavior. When the concept of free will is introduced, a sovereign individual feels a responsibility to act according to these guidelines set by society. Being free to act in any manner, the burden of responsibility is placed on the individual rather than the society. “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory” (Nietzsche 1989b, p. 61). Therefore, the central stimuli in the formation of conscience are this sense of responsibility and a trained memory.
Nietzsche says that while our current view of guilt is associated
In his second essay of the Geneaology of Morals, Nietzsche attempts to identify and explain the origin of the conscience. He does not adopt the view of the conscience that is accepted by the “English Psychologists”, such as Bentham, J. Mill, J.S. Mill and Hume, as the result of an innate moral feeling. Rather, it is his belief that the moral content of our conscience is formed during childhood under the influence of society. Nietzsche defines the conscience as an introspective phenomenon brought about by a feeling of responsibility, in which one analyzes their own morality due to the internalization of the values of society. This definition holds the position that the conscience is not something innate to humans, rather it has arisen through evolution. In light of this, this paper will give insight into how Nietzsche reaches this conclusion, as well as what results from it. In order to do this there will be discussion of guilt, punishment, the will to power and implications from society.
The way in which we currently view guilt is as having an association with accountability and responsibility. To hold a promise; one is required to have a trained and able memory, and to have a confidence in one’s own predictability. Society and morality allow us to make ourselves predictable by providing a common set of laws and customs to guide behavior. When the concept of free will is introduced, a sovereign individual feels a responsibility to act according to these guidelines set by society. Being free to act in any manner, the burden of responsibility is placed on the individual rather than the society. “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory” (Nietzsche 1989b, p. 61). Therefore, the central stimuli in the formation of conscience are this sense of responsibility and a trained memory.
Nietzsche says that while our current view of guilt is associated