Moral

Topics: Morality, Philosophy, Rational choice theory Pages: 12 (3744 words) Published: July 19, 2013
FACULTY OF APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE

SEMESTER: MAY 2013

COURSE CODE: MPW2153

MORAL STUDIES

E-TUTOR: MHANOGARAN A/L ARUJUNAN

NAME: ELIZABETH AUDRINE WONG LIN INN
MATRICULATION NO: 810108135682001
IDENTITY CARD NO.: 810108135682
TELEPHONE NO.: 0168086059
E-MAIL : AUDRINE@OUM.EDU.MY
LEARNING CENTRE: PPW SARAWAK

No| Table of content| Page|
1.0| Introduction| 3|
2.0| Four types of Moral Thoughts| 3|
| 2.1 Naturalism| 3|
| 2.1.1 Characteristics of Naturalism| 4|
| 2.1.2 Consequences of Naturalism| 4|
| 2.2 Emotivism| 6|
| 2.2.1 Characteristics of Emotivism| 7|
| 2.2.2 Consequences of Emotivism| 7|
| 2.3 Intuitional| 7|
| 2.3.1 Characteristics of Intuitional thoughts| 8|
| 2.3.2 Consequences of Intuitional thoughts| 8| | 2.4 Rationalist| 9|
| 2.4.1 Characteristics of Rationalists| 9|
| 2.4.2 Consequences of Rational thoughts| 10|
4.0| Conclusion| 11|
5.0| References| 12|

1.0 Introduction

Moral thought is a core motivation behind how a person views the world around him and the actions he carries out. The emphasis placed on individual thought processes, beliefs and actions makes social cognitive theory a good predictor of individual and group behavior. It is also useful in identifying ways that behavior can be modified or changed. The discussion in this topic encompasses moral thoughts like naturalism, emotivism, intuitional and rationalism. The characteristics and the effects of each type of moral thought will be discussed in this topic. The combined influence of environment, people and behavior forms a self-regulatory system within the individual that determines how he acts in certain situations. In this report, we will discuss matters that can influence the traits of a person and how moral consistency can be achieved.

2.0 Four Types of Moral Thoughts

Morals are beliefs and values that conform to normal standards of what is right and wrong and deal with people's habits of conduct. Thomas Lickona (1980), a psychoanalysis stated that consideration has to be given to the development of moral thought; feelings and moral conduct where the actions and reactions may be differ between individuals due to different trends in moral thought on several factors: a) Parental/ guardian guidance, b) influence by peers, c) experiences and d) level of education. (OUM Module) The field of Moral development studies four types of the trends of Moral Thoughts: Naturalism, Emotivism, Intuitional and Rationalists. Over the years, the relative characteristics and consequences of these competing views have been vigorously examined and debated.

2.1 Naturalism

The moral naturalism is the thought that there is something intolerable about grounding morality in the dictates of a divine law giver. In conduct, naturalists view humans in a very objective way; they are very concerned with the underlying forces behind one's behavior and believe that one's environment and heredity shape a person's character (that is the major difference between naturalism and realism). 2.1.1 Characteristics of Naturalism

Naturalism is an outgrowth of realism. Like realism, it wants to present an almost photographically accurate version of "real" life. It’s full of facts and details about an everyday world ordinary people may well recognize. Naturalists’ central belief, in fact, is that individual human beings are at the mercy of uncontrollable larger forces that originate both within and outside them. These forces might include some of our more "animal" drives, such as the need for food, sex, shelter, social dominance, etc. Or, in a more "external" vein, these forces might include the natural environment, the man-made environment, or finance, industry, and the economy. Something, though, is always beating down and controlling the lives of...

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