Michael Walzer's Persecution Of War

The purpose of the War Convention is to establish the duties of the persons engaged in the act of aggression. Michael Walzer defined the War Convention as the articulated norms, customs, professional codes, precepts, religious, philosophical principles and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgement of military conduct. Thus, the War Convention may be interpreted as the multitude of non-binding moral criteria by which the justice of actions within the prosecution of conflict may be judged. The concern is with jus in bello, justice in war, and not jus ad bellum, which regards the just initiation of war. The distinction between the justice of war and the just prosecution of war is significant for the purpose of this essay, for it is the
The principles contend that in the prosecution of aggression, there are legitimate or permissible targets which are combatants, whether their cause be just or unjust. Conversely, noncombatants are prohibited and illegitimate targets. Both of these principles are significant, however, for our purposes, I will address the permissible element, as it that which Walzer deems unfair and, thus subjects to revision. The War Convention maintains that soldiers may be subjected to harm as soon as hostilities begin, as soldiers are a class set apart from the realm of peaceful activity. The reason for this belief is based on the rationale of the surrender of civilian rights and the gain of war rights. Civilians have the right to life and liberty. They ought to be immune from harm, and they also do not have the right to kill, nor to be killed. However, soldier’s war rights involve gaining the right to kill and to be killed. Thus, by merely engaging in war, soldiers lose the right to life and liberty and the as well as the immunity from harm. Finally, the remains the refusal to impose any limits on harming enemy soldiers based on “reason of war” which contends that certain actions are necessary to compel the submission of the enemy without extending the expenditure of time, life, and money. This permissiveness is problematic for, if the purpose of the
I argue this on the grounds that by forcing soldiers to kill, even within instances, wherein the individual at the end of the barrel is merely conducting human activity, does not expedite the end of hostilities. I have already refuted that claim. More importantly, the permissive principle does not merely steal the enemy’s right to life. It also corrupts the moral character of the soldier wielding the weapon, for it is one’s consciousness itself that refuses to kill an enemy that does not pose a military threat. To disregard one’s consciousness is to corrupt one’s essential being. And, since war is not a relationship between individual soldiers, but rather between political entities, the permissive element is furthermore a violation to human nature itself. Finally, no matter how many theories of war rights or conventions are presented, one fact which cannot be refuted is the inextricable quality of soldiers as human beings. It is for this reason that I agree with Walzer’s defence that sometimes morality involves doing less than is