Meta Analytic Reviews Of Board Composition Leadership Structure And Finan

Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, 269–290 (1998)

META-ANALYTIC REVIEWS OF BOARD
COMPOSITION, LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
DAN R. DALTON1, CATHERINE M. DAILY1*, ALAN E. ELLSTRAND2 AND
JONATHAN L. JOHNSON3
1

School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.
College of Business Administration, California State University, Long Beach, California, U.S.A.
3
School, of Business Administration, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas, U.S.A.
2

Careful review of extant research addressing the relationships between board composition, board leadership structure, and firm financial performance demonstrates little consistency in results. In general, neither board composition nor board leadership structure has been consistently linked to firm financial performance. In response to these findings, we provide metaanalyses of 54 empirical studies of board composition (159 samples, n = 40,160) and 31 empirical studies of board leadership structure (69 samples, n = 12,915) and their relationships to firm financial performance. These—and moderator analyses relying on firm size, the nature of the financial performance indicator, and various operationalizations of board composition— provide little evidence of systematic governance structure/financial performance relationships.
 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Strat. Mgmt. J. Vol. 19 269–290 (1998)

INTRODUCTION
There is a distinguished tradition of conceptualization and research arguing that boards of directors’ composition and leadership structure
(CEO/chairperson roles held jointly or separately) can influence a variety of organizational outcomes. This attention continues to be apparent in the academic literature (e.g., Baliga, Moyer, and
Rao, 1996; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Boyd, 1995;
Buchholtz and Ribbins, 1994; Daily and Dalton,
1994a, 1995; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Hoskisson, Johnson,
Key words: board composition; board leadership structure; firm

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