Malaysia Economic Growth
Malaysia Economic Growth
Title: Malaysia economic growth based on gross domestic product (constant prices) from year 1990 to year 2008. Year | Gross domestic product, constant prices | Percent Change | 1990 | 9.007 | | 1991 | 9.547 | 6.00 % | 1992 | 8.886 | -6.92 % | 1993 | 9.896 | 11.37 % | 1994 | 9.211 | -6.92 % | 1995 | 9.83 | 6.72 % | 1996 | 10.002 | 1.75 % | 1997 | 7.323 | -26.78 % | 1998 | -7.359 | -200.49 % | 1999 | 6.138 | -183.41 % | 2000 | 8.68 | 41.41 % | 2001 | 0.518 | -94.03 % | 2002 | 5.391 | 940.73 % | 2003 | 5.789 | 7.38 % | 2004 | 6.783 | 17.17 % | 2005 | 4.997 | -26.33 % | 2006 | 5.934 | 18.75 % | 2007 | 6.327 | 6.62 % | 2008 | 5 | -20.97 % | Note: Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year changes; the base year is country-specific.
Country-specific note: See notes for: GDP, constant prices (National currency).
Source: International Monetary Fund - 2008 World Economic Outlook
Anaylsis of Economic Malaysia
As Malaysian Eclipse emphasizes, Malaysia entered the Asian financial crisis 1997 with relatively strong fundamentals, partly because of the early set of regulations and restrictions on capital flows that it had instituted in 1989 and 1994. Malaysia had a much smaller share of short-term external debt then its fellow crisis countries. Most important, Malaysia's short-term debt was much lower than its foreign exchange reserves, which made the country somewhat less vulnerable to a run on its reserves. However, not all was well with the financial situation of Malaysia. Malaysia was a country with a very high level of general indebtedness, which made it vulnerable to a panic by investors. Part of Malaysia's problem stemmed from excessive credit creation based partly on very high equity prices. As a result, as the authors of Malaysian Eclipse argue, Malaysia was far from an "innocent bystander" in the etiology of the crisis. Instead, they argue, inappropriate financial
Title: Malaysia economic growth based on gross domestic product (constant prices) from year 1990 to year 2008. Year | Gross domestic product, constant prices | Percent Change | 1990 | 9.007 | | 1991 | 9.547 | 6.00 % | 1992 | 8.886 | -6.92 % | 1993 | 9.896 | 11.37 % | 1994 | 9.211 | -6.92 % | 1995 | 9.83 | 6.72 % | 1996 | 10.002 | 1.75 % | 1997 | 7.323 | -26.78 % | 1998 | -7.359 | -200.49 % | 1999 | 6.138 | -183.41 % | 2000 | 8.68 | 41.41 % | 2001 | 0.518 | -94.03 % | 2002 | 5.391 | 940.73 % | 2003 | 5.789 | 7.38 % | 2004 | 6.783 | 17.17 % | 2005 | 4.997 | -26.33 % | 2006 | 5.934 | 18.75 % | 2007 | 6.327 | 6.62 % | 2008 | 5 | -20.97 % | Note: Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year changes; the base year is country-specific.
Country-specific note: See notes for: GDP, constant prices (National currency).
Source: International Monetary Fund - 2008 World Economic Outlook
Anaylsis of Economic Malaysia
As Malaysian Eclipse emphasizes, Malaysia entered the Asian financial crisis 1997 with relatively strong fundamentals, partly because of the early set of regulations and restrictions on capital flows that it had instituted in 1989 and 1994. Malaysia had a much smaller share of short-term external debt then its fellow crisis countries. Most important, Malaysia's short-term debt was much lower than its foreign exchange reserves, which made the country somewhat less vulnerable to a run on its reserves. However, not all was well with the financial situation of Malaysia. Malaysia was a country with a very high level of general indebtedness, which made it vulnerable to a panic by investors. Part of Malaysia's problem stemmed from excessive credit creation based partly on very high equity prices. As a result, as the authors of Malaysian Eclipse argue, Malaysia was far from an "innocent bystander" in the etiology of the crisis. Instead, they argue, inappropriate financial