Dallas-Feeney Christopher P. The US and the Levant: The Dilemma of Hezbollah—Restoring the Sovereignty of Lebanon and Enabling Peace in the Levant Falkenburg Luke Civil War Relapse?: Hezbollah & Sectarianism in Post-War Lebanon DEC 11 2012 Masters Jonathan , Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah) . Counciil for Foreign Relations January 3, 2014 Meier Daniel The Effects of Arab Spring and Syrian Uprising on Lebanon May 2013 Ospina Mariano V. Syria, Iran, and Hizballah: A Strategic Alliance Global Security Studies, Winter 2014, Volume 5, Issue 1 Picard Elizabeth Lebanon in search of sovereignty: Post 2005 security dilemmas 2012 This chapter explores a main hypothesis: Short of regaining its status of sovereign nation-state in the international arena, post-2005 Lebanon might be considered a state with limited sovereignty, where citizenship remained dubious and national interest controversial. In a state of this kind, armed forces are prone to fragmentation along primordial identities, and often privatised while authoritarianism looms as the ultimate recourse against state dissolution and societal strife. The chapter is organised in two sections: The first section looks into the role, capabilities and interventions of national armed forces on the domestic and regional scenes. It stresses the limits of the military leadership‟s efforts to make Lebanon‟s national forces a powerful agent of national defence due to structural weaknesses and the transformation of war. It examines the political obstacles that prevented the state from acquiring a monopoly of legitimate force by contrasting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with the “National resistance” led by Hizballah. It shows how new international security threats shifted security policies from the national to the global arena. It concludes that the Lebanese security sector might be characterised as domestically “bifurcated” and internationally subordinate. The second section examines the image of the new security institutions (army, police and intelligence) intended to project domestically by instilling a patriotic ethos among draftees and enhancing pluralism within military units. It argues that despite such intentions and tangible improvements, the armed forces were not immune from the segmentation of society exacerbated by the 14 March/8 March division, which undermined cooperation between security institutions. In the meantime, in a context of privatisation and outsourcing of security missions, security institutions became prone to selective military-civilian cooperation within confessional networks. The reformed Lebanese armed forces remained unable to establish state authority over the national territory and provide a melting-pot for citizenship as had been expected after implementation of general drafting. Three contextual elements help explain this failure: (a) the enduring segmentation of the Lebanese society along primordial (family, clan and sect) fault-lines; (b) the steady percolation of Syrian Ba‟thist political culture into the Lebanese polity during nearly thirty years (1976-2005) of military presence and arbitrary rule; (c) Lebanon‟s security remained threatened by regional and international tensions that related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lebanon‟s army and security forces remained caught in a double bind: on the one hand they became a Western proxy in the fight against Jihadist networks. On the other hand, they proved unable to recapture the monopoly on national defence from Hizballah. Thus Lebanon remained hostage to regional conflict as well as to international tensions, most notably growing animosity between the US and Iran. Memory of Shihabism as a patriotic and development oriented doctrine explains why so many Lebanese put their trust in the military after the civil war, even more so when the Syrians withdrew in 2005. The population longed for order and was willing to see the military play a central role in Lebanon‟s political reconstruction....
Hezbollah manipulated the fractured state of the country to capitalize on the lack of protection and social services from the government and played on the fears of the people of Lebanon to fuse itself to the power of Lebanese politics
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