Institutional Virtue Analysis

Commentary on the Problem of Institutional Virtue
Philosopher Miranda Fricker attempts to make a connection between epistemic justice and the ideal of political freedom in her essay, Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom? She demonstrates that individuals must not face epistemic injustice when an institution interferes on its citizens’ liberty. She proposes a solution that consists of a collective ethos within institutions. In the essay titled, Generic Liberal Ideals and the Problem of Institutional Virtue, Ross Jensen offers two objections to Fricker’s argument. He claims that a collective ethos would result in an individual’s loss of political thought, and that implicit bias is contrary to a collective ethos. This commentary
First, Jensen argues that compounding a collective ethos within institutions will lead to a loss of an individuals’ freedom of thought. He states, “The implementation of institutional value would require that political institutions employ coercion in an attempt to alter an individuals’ beliefs” (Jensen 5). He believes that institutions will need to use threats or physical force to implement a collective ethos. These threats or physical altercations will violate personal freedom. An example includes the political institution that abides by a collective ethos and mandates educational programs and exams. If a judge refuses to comply with the exam, he/she will be reprimanded. If the perpetrator avoids compliance, then the institution will use physical force to subjugate the judge. Jensen’s second objection demonstrates that if there is a collective ethos and individuals have implicit biases, then epistemic injustice will still prevail within institutions. He uses data from Eric Mandelbaum that demonstrates that implicit biases are unintentional and uncontrollable. If implicit biases are a natural occurrence in humans, then a collective virtue is a waste of time and
She states, “The argument is that anyone who values non-interference is thereby committed, other things equal, to placing still more value on the secured non-interference that is non-domination” (1321). The issue arises when she offers a three-model system to implement a collective virtue within institutions. The Joint commitment model states that each individual must be willing to commit to a collective knowledge and practice it in an applied fashion. She then highlights that, “if any of them were to cease playing their part in sustaining the relevant intention, belief or action, then they are accountable to the other parties—who may rebuke them or, depending on the situation, at least demand an explanation” (1328). Additionally, this same issue arises when examining the other two models. She fails to realize that a mandatory collective knowledge results in domination, which undermines the claim that epistemic justice is necessary for political freedom. Dominating individuals who do not comply with the implemented collective virtue reflects Jensen’s claim regarding coercion because a system that demands an objective ethos would dominate its subjects with incentives and