Institutional Delay In Canada

A new role was thrust on the Supreme Court of Canada after the entrenchment of the Charter Rights and Freedoms in our Constitution in 1982. In order to promote and protect human rights in Canada, the Supreme Court had to passed several landmark decisions. It became a requirement for the Supreme Court to resolve issues that were previously thought as matters of policy for the legislative bodies. The policy making power of the Supreme Court of Canada has carried over into non-charter fields, such as administrative law, private law, and family law. However, an enormous impact of the Supreme Court and the Charter has been made in the field of Criminal Law, such as establishing and strengthening the rights of an accused individual.
The current
The Court’s judgment in R. v. Morin (1992) 1 SCR 771, set out “administrative guidelines” regarding claims made involving section 11(b) of the Charter, and how to assess the reasonableness of institutional delay. Some of the factors that the Supreme Court considers in regards to whether a delay is reasonable or not includes reasons for the delay, length of the delay, prejudicial effect on the Appellant and any waiver of time periods. In R v. Morin, on behalf of the majority, Sopinka J. explained that depending on the presence or absence of prejudice, the administrative guidelines for institutional delay could be adjusted. Between committal and trial, an eight to ten months administrative guideline was establish by the Court for Provincial Court cases, and following a preliminary hearing a delay of an additional six to eight months is considered reasonable. In R. v. Jordan case, the judge found 32.5 months institutional delay and a two months total Crown delay. Of the 32.5 months institutional delay, overwhelmingly lack of resources caused 19 months of delay in Provincial Court. After examining the total amount of institutional/Crown delay, the judge concluded that this delay “substantially exceeded” the guidelines set out by Morin, but, on its own, it is not an unreasonable delay. The Appellant submitted an application for a stay of proceedings that was dismissed by the trial judge, because the judge concluded, the prejudice experienced by Jordan resulting from the delay was not substantial. According to the judge, the delays were institutional and the Appellant charges were more serious. Any meaningful prejudice experienced by Jordan was not significant. Also, because of a prior conviction, he was subject to a conditional sentence order; his bail condition did not have any significant impact on him and while on bail he was also able to find employment. Thus, the Appellant