Roa found Africa and Asia to be extremely warm and friendly, and recalls forming bonds with representatives of African and Asian nations. He believed the source of the positive response he experienced was due to the inspiration Cuba must be for the African countries, especially those which still lacked independence. Roa was expressly irritated at the presence of Venezuela, claiming the obvious reason for his displeasure was the inability to accept a representative of “this ‘squatting gorilla’ Rómulo Betancourt.” With regard to the other Latin American observers, Roa explained that they “played the most ignominious role imaginable: in a single word, they were ridiculous. Not only were they isolated; They, and particularly the Venezuelan delegate, were utterly characterless, colourless and insipid.” Roa’s insults, while amusing, are also indicative of the degree of disdain and frustration held by Cubans toward the Latin American governments. While Cuba’s own position of nonalignment seems dubious at best, it is hypocritical of them to anger at other Latin American attendance (who, in turn, felt the same about Cuba). Roa found that “the position of all the Latin American countries, with the exception of Mexico, was utterly …show more content…
Mexico’s approach to both Cuba and the NAM were unique to Mexico. It was the sole nation to refuse to break diplomatic ties with Cuba in 1962, and remained the only state in the Western Hemisphere to maintain relations with Cuba until 1970. Mexico also uniquely did not vote for Cuba’s elimination from the OAS, and opposed the 1964 resolution which involved breaking economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba. Vanni Pettiná outlines President Adolfo López Mateos’ efforts to overcome dependency upon the United States by operating a more autonomous foreign policy. Mexico flirted with the notion of attending Belgrade in 1961. Although ultimately they did not attend, “Mexican diplomacy showed great interest in the gathering, which it saw as having the potential to formalise the existence of a new Third World political bloc amid Washington and Moscow.” Pettinà finds that Mexico’s foreign policy strategies showed a “sophisticated perception of the 1960s international system” and “a subtle calculation of the options that a more independent foreign policy disclosed in terms of the country’s bilateral relations with the United