How convincing do you find Karl Popper's claim that science is defined by its falsifiable claims? Discuss with reference to Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions
How convincing do you find Karl Popper 's claim that science is defined by its falsifiable claims? Discuss with reference to Kuhn 's theory of scientific revolutions.
The aim of this essay is to critically analyse the Popper 's falsifiability criterion of demarcation assessing whether it is convincing as a tool to solve the problem of induction and to make distinctions between science and pseudo-science or not. In the beginning, it is described the thought of Popper and its relations with the Positivism. Then a comparison will be made with Kuhn and his criterion of prevailing consensus and how the two theories of the two thinkers deal differently with scientific issues. Finally, are also taken into account other critiques to Popper 's criterion moved by Maxwell and Gillies.
The falsifiability, as a criterion of demarcation, rose from the philosophical problem of induction in science. The thinkers of the Positivism, first of all Bacon with his book Novum Organum, retained that was possible to infer knowledge from singular particular facts or observations. This was a direct attack to the Aristotle 's method (and to church 's method) which was based on the idea of starting from general propositions. The scientist should build his opinions from a series of single sensual (empirical) observations. Over time the repeatability of the features of these single observations will provide the bases to construct a general theory. This was the scientific paradigm of the induction. General laws are generated by empirical observations (Moses and Knutsen, 2007 pp. 21-22). Popper developed is position on induction from Hume. Hume states that can be no valid explanation to establish that facts of which we have had experience will resemble the ones we have not had any experience. Even after observing many conjunctions between different objects we cannot be sure that a phenomenon will happen again (Hume, 1740). Popper shares Hume 's point of view. He believes as well that it is
The aim of this essay is to critically analyse the Popper 's falsifiability criterion of demarcation assessing whether it is convincing as a tool to solve the problem of induction and to make distinctions between science and pseudo-science or not. In the beginning, it is described the thought of Popper and its relations with the Positivism. Then a comparison will be made with Kuhn and his criterion of prevailing consensus and how the two theories of the two thinkers deal differently with scientific issues. Finally, are also taken into account other critiques to Popper 's criterion moved by Maxwell and Gillies.
The falsifiability, as a criterion of demarcation, rose from the philosophical problem of induction in science. The thinkers of the Positivism, first of all Bacon with his book Novum Organum, retained that was possible to infer knowledge from singular particular facts or observations. This was a direct attack to the Aristotle 's method (and to church 's method) which was based on the idea of starting from general propositions. The scientist should build his opinions from a series of single sensual (empirical) observations. Over time the repeatability of the features of these single observations will provide the bases to construct a general theory. This was the scientific paradigm of the induction. General laws are generated by empirical observations (Moses and Knutsen, 2007 pp. 21-22). Popper developed is position on induction from Hume. Hume states that can be no valid explanation to establish that facts of which we have had experience will resemble the ones we have not had any experience. Even after observing many conjunctions between different objects we cannot be sure that a phenomenon will happen again (Hume, 1740). Popper shares Hume 's point of view. He believes as well that it is
Bibliography: Chalmers, A. 1976. What is this thing called science?. St. Lucia, Q.: University of Queensla Delanty, G Gillies, D. 1993. Philosophy of science in the twentieth century. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Hume, D. 1739. A treatise of human nature, available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705 Keuth, H. 2005. The philosophy of Karl Popper. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuhn, T. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Maxwell, G. 1974. Corroboration without demarcation. The Philosophy of Karl Popper, 1 pp. 292--321. Moses, J. and Knutsen, T. 2007. Ways of knowing. New York: Palgrave Macmillan O 'hear, A Papineau, D. 2003. The philosophy of science. Oxford: University Press. Popper, K. 2009. Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge.