Health Insurerance in Vn

Journal of Economics and Development Vol. 14, No.3, December 2012, pp. 5 - 21

ISSN 1859 0020

The Impact of Asymmetric Information in Vietnam 's Health Insurance:
An Empirical Analysis
Nguyen Thi Minh
National Economics University, Vietnam
Email: [e-mail]

Hoang Bich Phuong
National Economics University, Vietnam
Nguyen Thi Thao
BBG company, Vietnam

Abstract

The Vietnam Health Insurance Law in 2008 promulgated universal health care by
2014. To build up a sound and sustainable health insurance system towards this goal, we need to account for the effect of asymmetric information on the use of the health care services, namely moral hazards and adverse selection. This paper uses distinctive features of Vietnam 's health insurance system to separately estimate the effect of each type. Our results show that the effect of asymmetric information is quite severe and prevalent for old people, and is insignificant for young people. The results can be used for the construction of health insurance policies for Vietnam.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection, Health insurance, PSM

Journal of Economics and Development

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Vol. 14, No.3, December 2012

1. Introduction

insurance is not easy if they are dissatisfied with the program. So it is not a surprise that the situation with the voluntary insurance (HI) scheme is even much worse; the coverage is very limited at 20%, and the authorities are struggling to improve the situation.

In 1993, eight years after “Doimoi”, the establishment of the Vietnam health insurance program marks a new era for the Vietnamese health care system in which health care services are no longer provided free for all residents.
It is indisputable that the program plays an important role in helping Vietnamese residents access health services and in protecting them from financial shocks or poverty due to sudden serious illnesses (Wagstaff, 2005a, 2005b). As
such,

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