Goodman Green Argument

Q3
Intuitively, when considering the nature of Goodman’s arguments on inductions concluding all emeralds green, and all emeralds grue, respectively, I find the former to be a far more compelling argument. My initial reasoning behind this revolves around my intuitive feelings regarding the compelling nature of the green argument itself, as well as two issues I find when comparing the two arguments. The first issue being that the definition of green does not seem to be time dependent while the definition of grue is clearly time dependent. The second issue is that the definition of green seems to be fundamentally simple in its seemingly singular meaning whereas grue appears to be a combination of two different definitions. In order to effectively
When considering this issue under the simplified model one can once again let x be grue, A be green, and t be some arbitrary fixed time. Once again, green can be put in terms of grue, where green is grue before t. As previously stated though – given the model- this is only half the definition of green. The full definition of green within this model would be green is grue before t, or is y after t. What y is, is not of great importance, just as with the second-half of definition in the previous issue. The notable significance here is seeing that while an initial glance might lead one to presume green to be singular in meaning, when considered in the model it can be shown that green can be put in terms of seemingly two different definitions – similar in fashion to grue. As such, the issue with which the definition of green seeming more compelling than grue on the basis of being defined in simpler terms is also a false differentiation and therefore cannot be used to determine the overall compelling nature of one induction over the