Free-Will Vs Determinism
Difference between free will and determinism
free will vs. determinism
The question of free will vs. determinism has been debated for a long time. Some people believe humans have the capability to use free will. For many theists, free will is a gift from God. They believe that if people did not have free will then they are not morally responsible for their actions. However others argue that human’s actions are due to determinism, so if humans follow the course of natural law, it is hard to believe that actions are freely chosen. Except then the question occurs, why anything should be debated if everything is based on determinism.
Free will is the ability to make free choices that are unconstrained from outer situations or by fate …show more content…
This is a metaphysical view about the nature of things and the world. It is sometimes argued that determinism implies that everything in the future can be, in principle, predicted, and that events in the past are, in principle, explainable. There are natural laws of science which have the form: All X's are (or, are followed by) Y's which is equivalent to: If X occurs then Y occurs. Thus, if we know the initial condition (X occurs) and the law (If X then Y) we can explain/predict the occurrence of Y. Determinism is the contention that all physical (and mental) events in the universe can be incorporated under such laws. This is NOT the view that we can actually predict everything. Our ignorance of facts is enormous and we certainly do not know all the laws and statistical regularities which describe events
Rocks of sufficient size and thrown with sufficient speed cause glass to break. Lowering the temperature of water below 32 degrees causes water to freeze. Knives through hearts cause death. There are causes for why my car starts, and if it doesn't, there are causes for that too. When we say that some event "x" causes some event "y" we seem to be asserting that given that x occurred, then y HAD to occur, or that it MUST …show more content…
Others say, or imply, that they do know what it is. Of these, some—the pessimists perhaps—hold that if the thesis is true, then the concepts of moral obligation and responsibility really have no application, and the practices of punishing and blaming, of expressing moral condemnation and approval, are really unjustified. Others—the optimists perhaps—hold that these concepts and practices in no way lose their raison d’être if the thesis of determinism is true. Some hold even that the justification of these concepts and practices requires the truth of the thesis. There is another opinion which is less frequently voiced: the opinion, it might be said, of the genuine moral sceptic. This is that the notions of moral guilt, of blame, of moral responsibility are inherently confused and that we can see this to be so if we consider the consequences either of the truth of determinism or of its falsity. The holders of this opinion agree with the pessimists that these notions lack application if determinism is true, and add simply that they also lack it if determinism is false. If I am asked which of these parties I belong to, I must say it is the first of all, the party of those who do not know what the thesis of determinism is. But this does not stop me from having some sympathy with the others, and a wish to reconcile them. Should not ignorance, rationally, inhibit such sympathies? Well, of course, though
free will vs. determinism
The question of free will vs. determinism has been debated for a long time. Some people believe humans have the capability to use free will. For many theists, free will is a gift from God. They believe that if people did not have free will then they are not morally responsible for their actions. However others argue that human’s actions are due to determinism, so if humans follow the course of natural law, it is hard to believe that actions are freely chosen. Except then the question occurs, why anything should be debated if everything is based on determinism.
Free will is the ability to make free choices that are unconstrained from outer situations or by fate …show more content…
This is a metaphysical view about the nature of things and the world. It is sometimes argued that determinism implies that everything in the future can be, in principle, predicted, and that events in the past are, in principle, explainable. There are natural laws of science which have the form: All X's are (or, are followed by) Y's which is equivalent to: If X occurs then Y occurs. Thus, if we know the initial condition (X occurs) and the law (If X then Y) we can explain/predict the occurrence of Y. Determinism is the contention that all physical (and mental) events in the universe can be incorporated under such laws. This is NOT the view that we can actually predict everything. Our ignorance of facts is enormous and we certainly do not know all the laws and statistical regularities which describe events
Rocks of sufficient size and thrown with sufficient speed cause glass to break. Lowering the temperature of water below 32 degrees causes water to freeze. Knives through hearts cause death. There are causes for why my car starts, and if it doesn't, there are causes for that too. When we say that some event "x" causes some event "y" we seem to be asserting that given that x occurred, then y HAD to occur, or that it MUST …show more content…
Others say, or imply, that they do know what it is. Of these, some—the pessimists perhaps—hold that if the thesis is true, then the concepts of moral obligation and responsibility really have no application, and the practices of punishing and blaming, of expressing moral condemnation and approval, are really unjustified. Others—the optimists perhaps—hold that these concepts and practices in no way lose their raison d’être if the thesis of determinism is true. Some hold even that the justification of these concepts and practices requires the truth of the thesis. There is another opinion which is less frequently voiced: the opinion, it might be said, of the genuine moral sceptic. This is that the notions of moral guilt, of blame, of moral responsibility are inherently confused and that we can see this to be so if we consider the consequences either of the truth of determinism or of its falsity. The holders of this opinion agree with the pessimists that these notions lack application if determinism is true, and add simply that they also lack it if determinism is false. If I am asked which of these parties I belong to, I must say it is the first of all, the party of those who do not know what the thesis of determinism is. But this does not stop me from having some sympathy with the others, and a wish to reconcile them. Should not ignorance, rationally, inhibit such sympathies? Well, of course, though