Feminist Epistemology
The Potential of Emotions in Feminist Epistemology: Developing Jaggar’s Account
By
Tina Strasbourg
University of Calgary
Abstract
In this paper I analyze the potential of Allison Jaggar’s suggestion that emotions in general, and outlaw emotions in particular, be incorporated into feminist epistemology. Jaggar advocates a standpoint theory of emotions, and suggests that the emotions of the oppressed in particular are helpful rather than inimical to acquiring knowledge. I argue that although there are some potential problems with Jaggar’s approach, these problems are common to standpoint theories and can be addressed by applying the solutions offered by other feminist theorists.
One common criticism made by feminist epistemologists[i] is the critique of traditional epistemology’s notions of objectivity and neutrality. As Naomi Scheman puts it, in traditional epistemology “[t]hose who are taken to be in the best position to know are those who are believed to be objective, distanced, dispassionate, independent, and nonemotionally rational” (3-4).[ii] According to Allison Jaggar, the result of this conception of the knower in modern epistemology is a sharp distinction between reason and emotion where reason is privileged because emotions are viewed as involuntary responses that distort our rational observations of the world, which in turn distort the knowledge we can gain from these observations (1992). She further argues that this distinction contributes to the denial of women’s epistemic authority since women are associated with emotions and men with reason, and so men became the standard by which epistemic authority is judged. This is just one of many concerns feminist epistemologists share. However, there are many dissimilarities between feminists as to how to deal with the problems in traditional epistemology.[iii] One approach that I will focus on in this paper is feminist standpoint theory, particularly the
By
Tina Strasbourg
University of Calgary
Abstract
In this paper I analyze the potential of Allison Jaggar’s suggestion that emotions in general, and outlaw emotions in particular, be incorporated into feminist epistemology. Jaggar advocates a standpoint theory of emotions, and suggests that the emotions of the oppressed in particular are helpful rather than inimical to acquiring knowledge. I argue that although there are some potential problems with Jaggar’s approach, these problems are common to standpoint theories and can be addressed by applying the solutions offered by other feminist theorists.
One common criticism made by feminist epistemologists[i] is the critique of traditional epistemology’s notions of objectivity and neutrality. As Naomi Scheman puts it, in traditional epistemology “[t]hose who are taken to be in the best position to know are those who are believed to be objective, distanced, dispassionate, independent, and nonemotionally rational” (3-4).[ii] According to Allison Jaggar, the result of this conception of the knower in modern epistemology is a sharp distinction between reason and emotion where reason is privileged because emotions are viewed as involuntary responses that distort our rational observations of the world, which in turn distort the knowledge we can gain from these observations (1992). She further argues that this distinction contributes to the denial of women’s epistemic authority since women are associated with emotions and men with reason, and so men became the standard by which epistemic authority is judged. This is just one of many concerns feminist epistemologists share. However, there are many dissimilarities between feminists as to how to deal with the problems in traditional epistemology.[iii] One approach that I will focus on in this paper is feminist standpoint theory, particularly the
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