Federalist 47 and 48 Responses

Federalist 47 and 48 Responses

Federalist 47- In this paper, Madison is responding to the issue of having a federal government. He argues against the assumption that this new government will be allotted too much power and control America as an empire. In response, Madison writes that the U.S Constitution balances the government well by using the system of separation of powers among the executive, judiciary, and legislature. Madison also stated that these powers would blend and intertwine; however that would not affect the factor of separation of power. To support his argument, Madison referred to the writings of Montesquieu. According to Montesquieu, tyranny results when one branch of government concurrently holds the powers of another branch. However, Madison argues that Montesquieu "did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other." He interprets this as a system that supports checks and balances. Overall, he responds by stating his views on separation of power and by stating checks and balances has been followed in individual state constitutions before, so it should be trusted now.
He is very compelling as states that the system of checks and balances has been in former constitutions of the thirteen states, such as the New Hampshire Constitution where it says the senate could serve as a judicial tribunal for impeachments. All in all, he was very persuading by using past laws to support his present case.

Federalist 48- As the paper is named, “These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other”, he is obviously responding and building on to Federalist 47 by arguing that the branches of government can be connected, while remaining “separate but distinct”. The paper discusses how for the branches to be “separate and distinct", they must have "a constitutional control" over each other. In the paper, he talked about whom everyone agrees that powers belonging to one department ought not to be directly and completely controlled by either of the other departments, however neither of them should be able to overrule the others. He then discussed how they should be effectively restraint by putting precise boundaries for each branch. It then analyzes how which branch of government usually gets the most control and what branch usually people are most scared of, that being the executive branch. He says we don’t have to worry about the executive branch; reasons include the claim that the legislature is "sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions" and that its powers are both "more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits". He is also convincing in this paper as he references the Virginia and Pennsylvania State Governments constitutional powers, and how they exceeded the power of each branch, thus it is insufficient in controlling the powers o