Explain and assess Mackenzie’s argument that Schechtman overlooks the first personal significance of the body in the constitution of identity.
Catriona Mackenzie’s (2009) Personal Identity, Narrative Integration and Embodiment, encapsulates a powerful critique and understanding of the significance of first personal constitution towards personal identity. Marya Schechtman’s (1996_ book The Constitution of Selves is critically assessed revealing a failure to recognize the degree to which, Mackensive believes, first personal significance of the body influences the constitution of identity. Mackenzie agrees with Schechtman on the role of narrative self-constitution possessing the ability to elucidate this signficance in the construction of identity, however, shcetman fails to mature these facets because her solution reprdouces problematic assumptions of both body and psychological continuity theoriests as the body as both a mere organisms and about our subjectivity, as entirely psychological. Mackenzie refutes this claiming that although people are not identical to their bodies, their personhood is constituted “in relation to an ongoing but changing bodily perspective that, along with character, provides a principle of stability and permanence that gives rise to a sense of ourselves as persisting subjects.” 114 Ref Mackenzie sustains a valid argument adhering to the complex process of bodily perspective development, which operates as an environment for the ongoing harmony and intelligibility in constructing our own identities. Schetman’s highlights how prior philosophical literature sought to adress CONCERNS of personal identity through the process of reidenitfication, however, Mackenzie argues what matters most to identity is the dynamic of characterisation. The main concern about continuity of identity revolve around what it is that constitutes a person as the same temporally extended subject. Mackenzie later answers this through an...
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