Ethical Dilemma

“The Real Price of Foreign Food Aid”

Tahirah Marston
Human Rights and Ethics
Final Paper
America 's food assistance programs began in 1812 when President James Madison sent emergency aid to earthquake victims in Venezuela. This was the United States’ first foreign food aid initiative that successfully supplanted these victims need for food. Years later, Herbert Hoover led a feeding program in Russia during the 1920 's, in addition to famine relief programs during World War I and World War II in Europe. These programs established the U.S. as an aid providing society. In 1949, the United States launched the ‘Marshall Plan’, which brought food to many African countries in need of aid. The ‘Marshall plan’ was unlike previous plans enacted by the U.S., and its creation changed the spirit and nature of foreign food aid as well as having had a detrimental effect on the African countries receiving aid from the program. U.S. politics and policies dealing with foreign food aid have had detrimental economic, cultural, and social effects on African nations receiving aid. In the late 1940s ‘Marshall Plan’ administrators “poured over $13 billion worth of financial and food aid into Africa” (2). This $13 billion dollars served as an incentive for U.S. farmers to up their production level and hopefully secure a sizeable amount of the subsidies that the government was offering. It was only after the ‘Marshall plan’ that U.S. foreign food aid became a profit seeking business. Farmers would overproduce crops in an attempt to sell it to the U.S. government. This overproduction was a direct result of the subsidies provided for these American farmers. This plan was somewhat beneficial for the recipient nations because they received aid, but arguably detrimental to the spirit of foreign food aid. It also forces us, as citizens of the world, to really question how America’s well-intentioned foreign aid program spawned into a self-serving relationship between humanitarian aid and American politics.
One of the most detrimental policies that had the worst affect on African societies receiving aid is the ‘Point Four Program.’ President Truman helped to enact and pass the ‘Point Four program’ in which he declared would be "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of undeveloped areas.” (3) This theory, which embodied the surface of the Marshall plan, resonated with future presidents and became the foundation for the ‘Food for Peace Program’. The ‘Food for Peace’ Program “Public Law (PL 480)” was signed into law as the Agricultural Trade Development Act by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on July 10, 1954. Eisenhower said that the purpose of the legislation was to “lay the basis for a permanent expansion of our exports of agricultural products with lasting benefits to ourselves and peoples of other lands.” (3) This quote by the President solidified the “spirit” of foreign food aid as profit seeking. The president talks of ‘permanent expansion’, which implies the intention of the program to be a long-term solution. He also goes on to say that the “exports of our agricultural products will have lasting benefits to ourselves and peoples of other lands.” This suggests that the president is aware that foreign food aid has become a profit seeking institution, and suggests that this notion is actually beneficial to both recipient and donor nations. However, in somewhat difficult economic times for the U.S. farmer this solution to export overproduced crops seemed to be an economic win and public relations win for the U.S. Foreign food aid was originally created to help countries that had experienced hardships and were in need of a short-term solution. The creation of foreign food aid as a profit seeking business completely destroyed this notion and proved to be an economic weapon against countries in Africa receiving aid. “Analysts have concluded that the revitalization of Zambia was retarded by ample foreign food aid.” (4) The “over giving” of food aid un-incentivized recipient countries, like Zambia, to develop long-term solutions, especially when the U.S. was willing supplant foreign food aid as a long-term solution. Therefore, foreign food aid became a crippling economic weapon that replaced indigenous solutions. It became a long-term solution that hindered the recipient nations ability to flourish independently. The most significant sector of the African economy that was essentially destroyed due to foreign food aid is the agricultural sector. Americans have a long tradition of generous donations, but what is the true price of this aid? From the film, “The Price of Aid” we are shown the true price of aid through the eyes of the recipient nations in Africa. In this film we were confronted with the hardships that these recipient nations incur after accepting aid. It is evident that continuous aid from the US is crippling to these recipient nations, because politicians in the U.S. never really evaluated the true price of this aid. By exporting genetically modified foods from the U.S. to these African nations, the African agricultural sector has had to struggle to stay viable. In the film, “The Price of Aid” Zambian government officials, including former and present ministers of Agriculture explain how foreign food donations perpetuate a state of dependency among African and other recipient nations.
The U.S. has not internalized the crippling cultural effect that food aid has had on African societies. African farmers, from nations receiving aid, no longer have incentive to produce crops that could sustain livelihood. Since U.S. crops are genetically modified and essentially free, African farmers simply cannot compete. This notion completely disrupts the balance in these African nations by removing a form of livelihood from the very people they intended to help. By not considering this cultural effect, the U.S. has essentially eliminated the need for farmers in these recipient nations, altering their cultural identity.
Recently NGOs from the U.S. have realized this system of US foreign food aid has had detrimental economic and cultural effects. Some institutions have taken this notion a step further and have discovered that USAID also has crippling social effects in these African nations. CARE, one of the world 's biggest charities, is walking away from about $45 million a year in federal funding, saying American food aid is not only “plagued with inefficiencies, but may hurt some of the very poor people it aims to help.” (9) It’s decision has deeply divided the world on the case of food aid. CARE’s argument reiterates what the point that the practice of selling tons of American farm products in African countries is not beneficial. In fact these products competes with the crops of struggling local farmers, creating a social disparity. "If someone wants to help you, they shouldn 't do it by destroying the very thing that they 're trying to promote," said George Odo, a CARE official.
Under the system, the U.S. government buys the goods from American agricultural farmers, ships them overseas on mostly American-flagged carriers and then donates the goods to the aid groups. The groups sell the products in poor countries and use the money to fund their anti-poverty programs there. In what part of this system is the African farmer included?
The US agricultural and shipping industries’ interest groups have tremendous political clout. This is one of the main reasons that the “flawed” system we have in place is still active. However, there needs to be a voice of change because this system is not only socially detrimental to these African nations, but unethical. The system creates a paradox between African farmers and the agricultural business in the U.S. Over the years, Humanitarian organizations have become contractors on behalf of the government, instead of entities enacted to speak on behalf of those in need. This has created an ethical dilemma for most of these organizations because without there advocacy there is no entity to protect the cultural identity of these recipient nations.
USAID has been allowed to continue for so long because on the surface the practice has been relatively successful. USAID has missions in 23 sub-Saharan African countries that deliver assistance within their countries, as well as four regional missions that deliver assistance for cross-border activities, especially with regards to economic growth and security. In total, USAID assistance is prevalent in 49 African countries totaling $6.4 billion in 2010, including $1.6 billion in humanitarian assistance and food aid.
Along with these successes, Africa has become a major focus for three Presidential Initiatives: Feed the Future to promote food security and economic growth; the Global Health Initiative to strengthen health systems; and the Global Climate Change Initiative to reduce vulnerability to and the effects of climate change. USAID support for democracy, good governance, peace and security provides a foundation critical to sustaining progress in these Presidential Initiatives. Throughout the years, USAID has responded quickly to humanitarian needs resulting from conflict, drought, and food crises. However, do these positive effects outweigh the social and ethical dilemmas that US food aid creates?
One of the most controversial social issues that have been created from US FOOD AID is the use of genetically modified crops. “In 2002, the World Food Program called for emergency aid, preferably in the form of funds, in response to severe local food shortages in Southern Africa. Instead of providing only funds, as most other donor countries did, the U.S. shipped 500,000 tons of whole-grain maize under the U.S. Emerson Trust program for distribution by the WFP and NGOs.” (5) The issue with this is that approximately half of all U.S. maize is genetically engineered, and because of this the U.S. does not segregate transgenic (GMO) crops from conventional crops. However, many African nations who were on the receiving end of this aid were not ecstatic about the genetically modified crops, which in accordance with the UDHR, they had all right to object. In article 25 section 1 of the UDHR “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” So, why shouldn’t these African nations have the right to choose a standard of living, including quality of food that is adequate for their people?
The governments of Zambia, Mozambique, Le- sotho, Zimbabwe and later Angola objected. The governments based their concerns on the still unknown health effects of transgenic maize on people for whom maize is a dietary staple (most GMO maize is used as animal feed or in foods that are a minor part of human diets in the U.S.). Another worry was that whole-kernel (rather than milled) corn was likely to be planted by some farmers, posing possible risks of contamination to locally adapted maize varieties. Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe accepted the grain on the condition that it is milled before being distributed. Malawi also joined the governments who objected, insisting that the maize be milled and that monitoring accompany the food aid to ensure it was not planted. Zambia still rejects transgenic food aid, but accepts maize and other food aid from non-GMO sources. The African stance against these genetically modified crops from the U.S has posed a social disparity among the African nations and the U.S. In the film “The Price of Aid” a member of the U.S. agricultural board took a stand essentially saying that “beggars cannot be choosers.” This notion exemplifies the social disparity between the U.S. and African nations receiving aid. This claim by the US official asserts a sense of dominance and power over these African nations on the sole basis that they are receiving “help” from America. Till this day, the U.S. actively opposes the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (an agreement under the convention), which gives member states the right to choose not to accept GMO imports under certain conditions. The question to ask, is why is the U.S. so opposed to this request, and what gives them the right to assert social and cultural dominance over another nation?
It is somewhat evident from this discussion that Food Aid is not the most effective and efficient option for aid in Africa. There are two disparate arguments from donor nations about the validity and necessity of foreign food aid. There is a belief that the most effective form of foreign aid isn’t aid at all, but private sector investment. These private investments “will naturally trickle down to those recipient nations and serve as stepping-stones for these nations to develop their own sustainable food sources.” (8) The other view, in which the U.S. employs, is that food is a desperate need for these recipient nations, so food aid is the most practical and necessary form of aid for these countries. The argument against this view is that there is no viable avenue for these recipient nations to become sustainable; rather dependence on foreign food aid becomes the only source of food. The question then becomes which view is better? Which view is right?
Both schools of thought agree that the problems in recipient nations have persisted and in many respects actually worsened despite “fifty years of foreign aid by the West (donor countries).” (1) However, two interpretations of this evidence can be derived. The first school of thought (used by the United Kingdom) would suggest that the use of foreign food aid is outdated and has no purpose. The other school of thought employed by the U.S., views this worsening of foreign problems as compelling proof that the United States and most economically advanced countries should sharply increase their foreign aid budgets, and provide more foreign food aid. However, since there is no philosophical common ground between the two camps, foreign aid policy discussions in Washington and other western capitals have tended to be either sterile or intemperately partisan. This trickles down to the recipient nations in a negative manner because the contention between the two schools of thought leaves the recipient nations without a unified stream of aid, or a viable plan to become self-sustaining.
Politics in the U.S., dealing with foreign food aid, have been the single most detrimental force in African nations ability to overcome adversities. In the 1960s, ‘Food for Peace’ began a concerted effort to help the newly independent nations of Africa develop their economies. “Since 1960, per capita food production in Africa has fallen 20 percent” (3). As a recent Foreign Policy article concluded, "Average per capita income in the continent at the end of the 1980s may be lower than it was at the beginning of the 1960s." (3) Despite huge influxes of development aid, export volumes for most African countries actually fell during the 1970s. This decline can be directly attributed to the influx of foreign food aid. The more foreign aid African governments received, the worse they have tended to perform.
In conclusion U.S. politics and policies dealing with foreign food aid have had detrimental economic, cultural, and social effects on African nations receiving aid. Economically, Africa nations who received Food Aid from the U.S. would have been better off if they received monetary donations as opposed to food donations. Monetary donations would have allowed these countries to grow and sustain a viable economy. Culturally, African farmers have essentially been named “unnecessary” due to US food aid and the farmers’ inability to compete. This lack of necessity to compete has had had detrimental effects on the cultural identity of these African farmers. Socially, it is devastating to realize that something as seemingly beneficial as providing food to foreign nations in need could metastasize into a profit seeking entity that disregards the needs of the people it was originally trying to help.

Bibliography

(1) "The History of Food Aid." U.S. Food Aid and Security. Food for Peace Program. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. <http://foodaid.org/resources/the-history-of-food-aid/>.

(2) "The U.S. International Food Aid Program." Catholic Relief Services. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. <http://crs.org/public-policy/pl-480-title-ii.cfm>.

(3) "USAID - 50 Years of Food For Peace." U.S. Agency for International Development. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp/50th/history.html>.

(4) Bovard, James. "The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid." The Cato Institute. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa065.html>.

(5) Miskel, James F. "The Debate About Foreign Aid." The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Feinstein International Center, 17 Jan. 1997. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/109>.

(6)"USDA Food Aid Programs: Fact Sheet." USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Web. 02 Apr. 2012. <http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/foodaid.asp>.

(7) "Fact Sheet: Humanitarian Assistance." U.S. Aid from the American People: Zambia. USAID. Web. <http://www.usaid.gov/zm/fact_sheets/humanitarian_assistance.pdf>.

(8) Merkovic-Orenstein, Alex. "Reform for U.S. Aid." Conflict Partisans Contempt. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. <http://www.partisans.org/2011/05/u-s-policy-on-food-aid-needs-serious-reform/>.

Bibliography: (1) "The History of Food Aid." U.S. Food Aid and Security. Food for Peace Program. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. &lt;http://foodaid.org/resources/the-history-of-food-aid/&gt;. (2) "The U.S. International Food Aid Program." Catholic Relief Services. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. &lt;http://crs.org/public-policy/pl-480-title-ii.cfm&gt;. (3) "USAID - 50 Years of Food For Peace." U.S. Agency for International Development. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. &lt;http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp/50th/history.html&gt;. (4) Bovard, James. "The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid." The Cato Institute. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. &lt;http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa065.html&gt;. (5) Miskel, James F. "The Debate About Foreign Aid." The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Feinstein International Center, 17 Jan. 1997. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. &lt;http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/109&gt;. (6)"USDA Food Aid Programs: Fact Sheet." USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Web. 02 Apr. 2012. &lt;http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/foodaid.asp&gt;. (7) "Fact Sheet: Humanitarian Assistance." U.S. Aid from the American People: Zambia. USAID. Web. &lt;http://www.usaid.gov/zm/fact_sheets/humanitarian_assistance.pdf&gt;. (8) Merkovic-Orenstein, Alex. "Reform for U.S. Aid." Conflict Partisans Contempt. Web. 02 Apr. 2012. &lt;http://www.partisans.org/2011/05/u-s-policy-on-food-aid-needs-serious-reform/&gt;.