Essay On Use Of Force In Correctional Institutions

In an attempt to acknowledge some of the shortcomings associated with the use of force policies and procedures in correctional institutions, this paper will outline several key factors surrounding the topic. First and for most, a discussion of what constitutes use of force in correctional institutions will be evaluated by examining policies of the State of North Carolina Department of Correction Division of Prisons. Subsequent to current policy, an analysis of the different levels associated with using force in a correctional setting will be conducted. Further, an evaluation and examples of excessive force used in a correctional setting will be given. Finally, an assessment of the techniques and technologies implemented to reduce situations
of excessive use of force will be discussed. While the use of force by police and correctional officers has the potential to preserve life and property, it is also a tremendous responsibility. When force is used inappropriately or excessively, civil rights violations are sure to ensue. Moreover, the understanding of unreasonable force is much more prevalent in law enforcement than that of correctional institutions. Therefore, associated research is much less readily available in terms of how prevalent correctional officers utilize force and potently use excessive force. Use of force in law enforcement is well-documented in research and governed by case law, federal law, state and local ordinances, and departmental policy.
However, use of force within correctional institutions, while still governed by law and policy, has little associated research (Griffin, 2001). Also, the use of force found in the correctional setting is viewed differently than that of law enforcement, primarily because of the availability of backup officers and a sense of heightened security that exists within correctional institutions (Griffin, 2001). Consequently, many of the incidents involving the use of force in correctional institutions are justified as necessary because such actions directly relate to officer or inmate safety, institutional security, and overall tranquility of the facility (Griffin, 2001). Therefore, situations arise where the use of force is evident; however, an investigation into the justification of such force is not always conducted (Rembert and Henderson, 2014). While this directly correlates to the level of force used and the consequences of these actions, for example, injuries to inmates or staff, exhaustive investigations are only prevalent when serious injury or death occurs (Rembert and Henderson, 2014). Simply, acquiring data from correctional facilities regarding officers using force on inmates is difficult, if possible to obtain (Griffin,
2001). Several situational examples exist for when a correctional officer may be required to use force to gain control of a situation. This force may also be exhibited in several forms, such as, officer presence, hands on physical force, mechanical restraints, individual control devices, chemical agents, electronic control devices, and firearms (State of North Carolina, 2011). In the context of corrections, use of force falls under two main categories according to the State of North Carolina Department of Correction Division of Prisons, Policy and Procedures; Deadly (lethal) force and Non-Deadly (less than lethal) force (State of North Carolina, 2011). The State of North Carolina provides a published version of policies and procedures that outlines four examples of when an officer is allowed to use deadly force and several examples when force of any level may be used (State of North Carolina, 2011). The first instance where an officer may lawfully use lethal force is to “prevent the escape of a convicted felon” (State of North Carolina, 2011). This guideline makes it imperative to know the classification of individual inmates and if this classification is not known, the policy does not provide lawful utilization of lethal force. The second instance where an officer may use lethal force is to “prevent or stop a life threatening assault on themselves or another person” (State of North Carolina, 2011). While this instance may seem straight forward, an officer must be able to articulate the details of the situation accurately or appropriately to ensure the subsequent actions are justified. The third instance where an officer may use lethal force is to “prevent escape of a pre-trial detainee awaiting felony charges” (State of North Carolina, 2011). Again, this guideline makes a priority of knowing an inmate's classification and stipulates without that knowledge lethal force is not allowed. Finally, the fourth instance given by the state stipulates that “deadly force may not be used solely to protect property or ensure compliance with a lawful order that does not implicate personal safety” (State of North Carolina, 2011). This guideline provides an acknowledgement that property in and of itself does not constitute the use of lethal force. Further, it clarifies that lethal force is not authorized unless a risk of serious injury or loss of life exists for self or others. While cases do exist where lethal force was used without justification, they make a negligible impact on the overall situations where force was used (Griffin, 2001). Unfortunately, statistical data provided by the Department of Justice regarding deaths in prison primarily combine homicides in three categories; by other inmates, assaults prior to incarceration and, caused by staff use of force. This combination of homicides makes an exact number of lethal force deaths difficult to obtain. While lethal force deaths undoubtedly occur in correctional institutions, there are significantly more instances of less than lethal force situations, often on a daily bases (Simpson, 2007).
Further, North Carolina expounds on policy regarding use of force by stating “the use of force shall be permissible only to the extent reasonably necessary for a proper correctional objective” and that “excessive force is prohibited” (State of North Carolina, 2011). The ambiguity of the policy leads to the potential of excessive force, while stating that excessive force itself is prohibited. Moreover, the extent of an action to be reasonable to one individual may be considered unreasonable to another. Similarly, an action considered excessive to one individual may not be considered excessive to another. This in turn leads to situations where correctional officers may be injured during an altercation due to the belief they are not permitted to use force or that that the force used must be equal to what they are receiving. Fortunately, North Carolina policy also stipulates that the prohibition of excessive does not mean that officers must first be in physical harm before engaging in appropriate recourse (State of North Carolina, 2011). Further, an officer is by no means required to combat an assault with equal force (State of North Carolina, 2011). Conversely, the fear of using excessive force in situations is nearly as relevant as the propensity to use excessive force (Griffin,
2001). With that, the determination of reasonable force after an incident is often asked of either Administrative Staff or the Court System (Rembert and Henderson, 2014). The determination of whether appropriate force was used in a situation is often considered by correctional Administrative Staff (Atherton, 2015). However, if an inmate involved in an excessive use of force situation petitions the court, the burden shifts to the court system to determine if excessive force was used (Rembert and Henderson, 2014). With a growing concern for excessive force, Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for personal liability created, and rightly so, an unprecedented number of claims of excessive force where many of the cases were decided on specific injury and not the totality of circumstances (Rembert and Henderson, 2014). Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case, Wilkins v. Gaddy (2010) that all excessive use of force claims must be decided on the nature of force, rather than the extent of the injury (Rembert and Henderson, 2014).