Counterterrorism Policy

Nevertheless, these are frequently cited terrorist incidents. In reality, “terrorist groups achieved their main policy objectives only three out of forty-two times—a 7 percent success rate” (cited in Abrahms, 2006: 51). Attacking civilians, ultimately, does not improve the chances of terrorism forcing political authorities into compliance. The contention is that attacking civilians miscommunicate the terrorist’s policy objectives (Abrahms, 2006: 56). A terror group's communication strategy breaks down when they demand hostile and unwavering maximalist objectives, such as declaring the eradication of entire societies. Governments are not going to forgo their political and social structures due to intimidation caused by attacking civilians; this
As Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson states, “terrorists use violence to provoke governments into harsh and indiscriminate counterterrorism responses in order to radicalize and mobilize a population whose interests the terrorists claim to represent” (des Mesquita & Dickson, 2014: 364). Mobilization works if the target over-reacts by enforcing repressive counterterrorism policies that negatively affects moderates (Berry, 1987: 8-12). Overreaction and repressive counterterrorism can create greater social, economic and political grievances that push moderates into the hands of the terrorist. An example is the case of IS: part of their tactic is to create a hostile divide between Islam and the West to radicalize supports for the Islamic State. According to an article published by the International Business Times, “about 20,000 fighters from around the world - 3,400 from Western countries - are estimated to have joined these groups” (Bora, 2015). Nevertheless, counterterrorism does not guarantee radicalized support for terrorist groups (des Mesquita & Dickson, 2014: 365). 20,000 foreign fighters, after all, is still a comparatively low number considering the total population the Islamic State has raged war
A government might be “aware that crackdowns are counterproductive, in the sense of increasing mobilization, but may have no other reasonable option to increase security” (des Mesquita & Dickson, 2014: 377). Also, a government must react, particularly in liberal democracies where there is a “greater pressure to ‘do something’” (Kydd & Walter, 2006: 80). Or a government could risk being viewed as weak and illegitimate. QUOTE? However, states could be more restrictive in their counter-terrorism response. Governments should not concede to the terrorist demands thus, should protect its sovereignty against future threats, however, with restraint. As Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson contends, governments should take a “soft line” approach to counter-terrorism, which would “significantly decrease the support for the extremists” (des Mesquita & Dickson, 2014: 374). A soft line approach to counterterrorism would take into account the welfare and protection of the population (moderates) to not risk further grievances. Therefore, fighting against terrorism prevents future attacks, while also decreasing the chances of sparking further