Cobra Operational Plan

On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and delivered a speech declaring the end of major combat operations in Iraq. The U.S. and Coalition partners, invading Iraq a mere six weeks prior had captured Baghdad and deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein. However, the long and arduous U.S. experience in Iraq had just begun. This paper evaluates U.S. military campaign planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom from COBRA II in 2002/2003 through “the Surge” of 2007 using operational design from JP 5-0 as a framework for the analysis. Planning for COBRA II demonstrates an imperfect understanding of the operational environment and an incomplete analysis of the termination, military endstate and objectives
COBRA II wasn’t as much a “bad plan” as it was an “incomplete” one. In planning, the commander’s operational approach is developed and refined using the elements of operational design. These elements include, among others, military endstate, objectives and termination. Military end state is “the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives.” The endstate is the goal of the operational approach. “Objectives describe what must be achieved” to realize the desired endstate. Termination criteria include a multitude of operational tasks including disengagement and a “transition to post-conflict operations.” Understanding termination criteria is critical to planning since, “effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the end state and the conditions that must exist to end military operations.” Briefing his top commanders, Franks was clear on the endstate, “The endstate for this operation is regime change.” CENTCOM’s objectives included, “regime leadership and power base destroyed; WMD capability destroyed or controlled; territorial integrity intact; ability to threaten neighbors eliminated; an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.” The operational approach for COBRA II focused on regime change, the endstate. Detailed planning for COBRA II basically ended with that endstate. The plans for controlling post-Saddam Iraq were sketchy at
As a result, after meeting the endstate of regime change, Iraq degenerated into bloody insurgency and rampant sectarian violence. During his speech on the Lincoln, Bush praised the forces that had swiftly “charged to Baghdad” and specifically lauded Rumsfeld and Franks for a “job well done.” Indeed the campaign to topple Saddam was impressive. However, along with the laurels of that victory, Rumsfeld and Franks also own the thorny crown of the debacle that followed. By contrast, Petraeus and the Surge planners better understood the operational environment, established more a comprehensive endstate and supporting objectives with a reframed the operational approach. The resulting increased security and stability in Iraq set the stage for the eventual U.S. withdrawal and influenced future U.S. planning