Camp David - Case Study
WWS Case Study 1/02
The Camp David Accords
A Case Study on International Negotiation
JONATHAN OAKMAN
The Camp David Accords
A Case Study on International Negotiation
Jonathan Oakman WWS 547- Final Project January 8, 2002
1 On November 19, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat shocked the international community by traveling to Jerusalem to speak before the Knesset. This unprecedented olive branch, offered to a country upon which he had ordered a surprise attack just three years before, set the stage for a peace process that would culminate sixteen months later in the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty. The pivotal point in this process came in September 1977 when President Carter brought Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the table and helped to hammer out the Camp David Accords. What factors caused these two players with seemingly incompatible interests to agree to a stable peace on behalf of their nations? There have been many attempts to answer this question from a variety of angles. The Camp David negotiations are rich with lessons for students of diplomacy, and they are worth revisiting as a case study. I will examine the events from two perspectives: the impact of two-level games and the characteristics of the leaders that made agreement possible. The first half of the study will trace the strategies of the players throughout the negotiations, and the second half will analyze how the outcomes were reached.
I. BACKGROUND At its heart, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a struggle between Zionist and Arab nationalism. Since the late 19th Century, these forces have fought over two major issues: control over Palestine and the existence of a Jewish state within the Muslim Arab world. The Jewish call for a homeland to protect them from persecution began in the 1880s, and continued with increased fervor after the Holocaust. In 1948, Israel came into being when the UN divided what had been the British protectorate of Palestine into Jewish and
The Camp David Accords
A Case Study on International Negotiation
JONATHAN OAKMAN
The Camp David Accords
A Case Study on International Negotiation
Jonathan Oakman WWS 547- Final Project January 8, 2002
1 On November 19, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat shocked the international community by traveling to Jerusalem to speak before the Knesset. This unprecedented olive branch, offered to a country upon which he had ordered a surprise attack just three years before, set the stage for a peace process that would culminate sixteen months later in the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty. The pivotal point in this process came in September 1977 when President Carter brought Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the table and helped to hammer out the Camp David Accords. What factors caused these two players with seemingly incompatible interests to agree to a stable peace on behalf of their nations? There have been many attempts to answer this question from a variety of angles. The Camp David negotiations are rich with lessons for students of diplomacy, and they are worth revisiting as a case study. I will examine the events from two perspectives: the impact of two-level games and the characteristics of the leaders that made agreement possible. The first half of the study will trace the strategies of the players throughout the negotiations, and the second half will analyze how the outcomes were reached.
I. BACKGROUND At its heart, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a struggle between Zionist and Arab nationalism. Since the late 19th Century, these forces have fought over two major issues: control over Palestine and the existence of a Jewish state within the Muslim Arab world. The Jewish call for a homeland to protect them from persecution began in the 1880s, and continued with increased fervor after the Holocaust. In 1948, Israel came into being when the UN divided what had been the British protectorate of Palestine into Jewish and
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