Business Law Case Study
Question 1:
Does s51(xx) of the Australian Constitution support s6(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Commonwealth Act?
What is the scope of s51(xx)?
In consistent with the Jumbunna principle, s51(xx) should be interpreted expansively (Gibbs J in Strickland; Mason J in Fontana Films and Tasmanian Dam; Murphy J in Tasmanian Dam).
In determining whether s51(xx) supports a law, we need to determine whether the character of the law by reference to the creation of rights, powers, liabilities, duties and privileges belonging to a s51(xx) corporation is sufficiently connected to s51(xx) (McHugh J in Re Dingjan; Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ in Work Choices; Grain Pool). Sufficient connection means that the law must have some significance for a s51(xx) corporation, and the law must regulate the conduct which have beneficial or detrimental effect on a s51(xx) corporation or its officers, employees or shareholders (McHugh J in Re Dingjan). The law will be …show more content…
Is s6(1)(c) sufficiently connected to s51(xx)?
Adopting a similar analysis as we did for s6(1)(b), it is unlikely that there is a sufficient connection between s6(1)(c) and s51(xx), and thus s6(1)(c) is constitutionally invalid with respect to s51(xx).
It is noteworthy that laws prescribing the industrial rights and obligations of constitutional corporations and their employees and the means by which they are to conduct their industrial relations are laws with respect to s51(xx) (Gaudron J in Re Pacific Coal approved by Work Choices). This implies that a law which regulates the conduct of an employee of a s51(xx) corporation will be constitutionally valid with respect to s51(xx) if such law is sufficiently connected to s51(xx) (McHugh J in Re Dingjan).
Does s51(i) of the Australian Constitution support s6(1)(d) of the Commonwealth Act?
What is the scope of
Does s51(xx) of the Australian Constitution support s6(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Commonwealth Act?
What is the scope of s51(xx)?
In consistent with the Jumbunna principle, s51(xx) should be interpreted expansively (Gibbs J in Strickland; Mason J in Fontana Films and Tasmanian Dam; Murphy J in Tasmanian Dam).
In determining whether s51(xx) supports a law, we need to determine whether the character of the law by reference to the creation of rights, powers, liabilities, duties and privileges belonging to a s51(xx) corporation is sufficiently connected to s51(xx) (McHugh J in Re Dingjan; Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ in Work Choices; Grain Pool). Sufficient connection means that the law must have some significance for a s51(xx) corporation, and the law must regulate the conduct which have beneficial or detrimental effect on a s51(xx) corporation or its officers, employees or shareholders (McHugh J in Re Dingjan). The law will be …show more content…
Is s6(1)(c) sufficiently connected to s51(xx)?
Adopting a similar analysis as we did for s6(1)(b), it is unlikely that there is a sufficient connection between s6(1)(c) and s51(xx), and thus s6(1)(c) is constitutionally invalid with respect to s51(xx).
It is noteworthy that laws prescribing the industrial rights and obligations of constitutional corporations and their employees and the means by which they are to conduct their industrial relations are laws with respect to s51(xx) (Gaudron J in Re Pacific Coal approved by Work Choices). This implies that a law which regulates the conduct of an employee of a s51(xx) corporation will be constitutionally valid with respect to s51(xx) if such law is sufficiently connected to s51(xx) (McHugh J in Re Dingjan).
Does s51(i) of the Australian Constitution support s6(1)(d) of the Commonwealth Act?
What is the scope of