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To what extent has the importance of the Tet Offensive of 1968 been overrated?
The Tet Offensive began on January 30th 1968, consisting of a series of simultaneous communist uprisings across 36 provincial and 64 district capitals of South Vietnam. Tet is an undisputed turning point in the war leading to almost immediate de-escalation of US commitment. The importance of Tet lies in its clear exposure of Johnson’s illegitimate claims of progress and the ineffectiveness of previous escalation in Vietnam. This caused a significant loss of support for the war, giving Johnson no choice but to reduce commitment to Vietnam. However, the de-escalation of commitment after Tet may not have been a result of Tet. There were clear problems with the American war effort before the offensive began which contributed to Johnson’s decision to end escalation of the conflict in March 1968. Tet revealed these problems in the war effort leading up to 1968. The review and change of US policy after the Tet Offensive was not necessarily because of the Tet Offensive, rather, the Offensive came at a time when US policy needed to be reviewed. The importance of Tet was that it emphasised the war could only be perpetuated not won. The view that Tet caused (rather than contributed to) American withdrawal from Vietnam is overrated.
By the end of 1968, public support for the war had declined substantially. A majority of the public had lost faith in the war after Tet which is shown by the plummet of Johnson’s approval ratings[1]. However, this decline in support is unjustified as American reportings of Tet presented a particularly negative and hostile picture of its implications on the war effort so that Americans would feel it was a defeat. This shows that the public outrage after Tet was overrated. Historians disagree on the cause of this decline in support. Ruane, Record and Schulzinger all claim that it was the Tet Offensive that caused the decline in public support for the war. They argue
The Tet Offensive began on January 30th 1968, consisting of a series of simultaneous communist uprisings across 36 provincial and 64 district capitals of South Vietnam. Tet is an undisputed turning point in the war leading to almost immediate de-escalation of US commitment. The importance of Tet lies in its clear exposure of Johnson’s illegitimate claims of progress and the ineffectiveness of previous escalation in Vietnam. This caused a significant loss of support for the war, giving Johnson no choice but to reduce commitment to Vietnam. However, the de-escalation of commitment after Tet may not have been a result of Tet. There were clear problems with the American war effort before the offensive began which contributed to Johnson’s decision to end escalation of the conflict in March 1968. Tet revealed these problems in the war effort leading up to 1968. The review and change of US policy after the Tet Offensive was not necessarily because of the Tet Offensive, rather, the Offensive came at a time when US policy needed to be reviewed. The importance of Tet was that it emphasised the war could only be perpetuated not won. The view that Tet caused (rather than contributed to) American withdrawal from Vietnam is overrated.
By the end of 1968, public support for the war had declined substantially. A majority of the public had lost faith in the war after Tet which is shown by the plummet of Johnson’s approval ratings[1]. However, this decline in support is unjustified as American reportings of Tet presented a particularly negative and hostile picture of its implications on the war effort so that Americans would feel it was a defeat. This shows that the public outrage after Tet was overrated. Historians disagree on the cause of this decline in support. Ruane, Record and Schulzinger all claim that it was the Tet Offensive that caused the decline in public support for the war. They argue